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A CROWDED ROOM OR THE PERFECT FIT?
EXPLORING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TREATMENT
IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS FOR
SELF-IDENTIFIED LGBT INDIVIDUALS
HERBERT C. BROWN, JR.*
ABSTRACT
The lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) civil rights
movement has made tremendous advances over the years. Many polls
show that acceptance of same-sex marriage and other rights for LGBT
individuals are at their highest.1 These polls have also shown that
an overwhelmingly large population of younger Americans support
and accept LGBT individuals.2 With this growing acceptance, more
Americans are deciding to come out.3 In fact, some individuals are
beginning to come out in application processes for colleges and univer-
sities—telling the prospective colleges and universities that they are
gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgendered. One question is whether this
information should be used in giving affirmative action treatment
to individuals who have identified themselves as a member of the
LGBT community.
Affirmative action programs have been around since the early
1960s.4 Originally created to end discrimination that had plagued
the African-American community and to give African Americans
equal opportunities, affirmative action programs have now morphed
into a way to counter discrimination on several grounds, including
national origin, religion, and gender.5 Affirmative action programs
also act as a way to compensate for past discrimination, persecution,
* Associate Professor of Law, Southern University Law Center. He serves as the
Director of the Louis Berry Institute for Civil Rights and Justice. Special thanks to
Professor Evelyn Wilson for her mentoring and generous support of this project.
1. Lydia Saad, U.S. Acceptance of Gay/Lesbian Relations is the New Normal: For
Third Year, Majority Says Gay/Lesbian Relations are Morally Acceptable, GALLUP (May 14,
2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/154634/Acceptance-Gay-Lesbian-Relations-New-Normal
.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/MJM5-KKCH.
2. Id. (stating that adults 18-34 are more supportive of gay rights than counterparts).
3. A Survey of LGBT Americans: Attitudes, Experiences and Values in Changing
Times, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 13, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/06
/13/a-survey-of-lgbt-americans/, archived at http://perma.cc/5DNT-NLZH.
4. Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 1, 46–47 (2002) (discussing the origins of affirmative action during the Kennedy ad-
ministration in 1961).
5. Id. at 47 (discussing President Lyndon B. Johnson’s addition of women to affirma-
tive action in 1967).
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or exploitation by the majority class of a certain minority class, and to
address existing discrimination.6 Often used in government, education,
and the private sectors, these programs attempt to ensure that minor-
ity groups are adequately represented and have equal opportunities.7
Since their inception, affirmative action programs have always
been the subject of heated debate.8 The United States Supreme Court
has had to determine the constitutionality of affirmative action pro-
grams in many cases.9 Also, in response to the debate, some states
have created constitutional amendments banning affirmative action
programs.10 The debate is even more heated in light of the idea that
some see affirmative action programs as reverse discrimination, that
may take away opportunities for many individuals that are a part of
the majority class.11
Even though the debate continues, it has been questioned
whether potential students who disclose that they are a member of
the LGBT community should be awarded affirmative action treatment
in the admission process of colleges and universities.12 This addition
to the idea of affirmative action programs may find support in the op-
pression and forced invisibility of gay and lesbian individuals through-
out American history.13 Perhaps there may also be support in the
“diversity rationale,” which states that there is a compelling interest
in student diversity in colleges and universities.14 Thus, the idea of
affirmative action programs for LGBT individuals may not be that
6. Id. at 22.
7. Id. at 9–13.
8. Id. at 22.
9. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 557 (2009); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs.
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 701 (2007); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
307 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 245 (2003); Adarand Constr. v. Peña, 515 U.S.
200, 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 469 (1989); Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 266-67 (1979); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 424-25 (1971).
10. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Conservatives Forge New Strategy to Challenge
Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1995, at A1; Steven A. Holmes, Victorious Pref-
erence Foes Look for New Battlefields, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1998, at A25; Sue Anne
Pressley, Florida Plan Aims to End Racial Preference Policies, WASH. POST., Nov. 11,
1999, at A15.
11. Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism as a Zero-Sum Game
That They Are Now Losing, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 215, 215–17 (2011).
12. Scott Jaschik, Affirmative Action for Gay Students, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Oct. 9,
2006), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/10/09/gay, archived at https://perma
.cc/7XTT-GP3T; see also Annemarie Mannion, Elmhurst College is Curious: Are You
LGBT?, CHI. SUN TIMES (Aug. 26, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-08-26/news
/ct-met-elmhurst-college-20110826_1_lgbt-elmhurst-students-elmhurst-college, archived
at http://perma.cc/KM2A-PF94.
13. Jeffrey S. Byrne, Affirmative Action for Lesbians and Gay Men: A Proposal for True
Equality of Opportunity and Workforce Diversity, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 65 (1993).
14. Id. at 71 n.103.
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far removed from the original foundation of affirmative action pro-
grams. However, recently many Americans have noticed the tremen-
dous advances made by gay-rights organizations.15 In fact, a brief on
behalf of the House of Representatives in support of the Defense of
Marriage Act states that the LGBT civil rights movement “[has]
gained more political ground in less time than just about any other
interest group in American political history.”16 This information is
used as the foundation of an argument that LGBT individuals are not
in need of protected status because they are not a politically power-
less group.17 Thus, there is no need for programs designed to give
them affirmative action treatment.
Furthermore, the addition of LGBT individuals into the idea of af-
firmative action has not been accepted very well. A 2009 national sur-
vey found that fifty-five percent of voters are opposed to affirmative
action programs in general.18 Moreover, the same survey determined
that an overwhelming majority of voters, sixty-five to twenty-seven
percent, opposed the application of affirmative action programs to
LGBT individuals.19
Several questions regarding affirmative action programs remain
unanswered. However, answers are desperately needed to ease the
frustration of colleges and universities seeking to increase student
body diversity. To increase student body diversity, some colleges and
universities have begun to debate whether students that identify
themselves as gay or lesbian, in the application process, should be
given affirmative action treatment.20 In fact, Elmhurst College in
Elmhurst, Illinois has begun asking applicants their sexual orienta-
tion during the application process,21 and Yale School of Medicine
has begun targeting LGBT applicants in their recruitment efforts.22
15. Robert Barnes, Same-sex Marriage Cases Wind Their Way to Supreme Court as
Political Climate Changes, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/politics/same-sex-marriage-cases-wind...court-as-political-climate-changes/2011/09/25
/gIQABW03wK_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/S8VC-HLXZ (quoting a legal brief




18. Peter Brown, U.S. Voters Disagree 3–1 with Sotomayor on Key Case, Quinnipiac
University National Poll Finds; Most Say Abolish Affirmative Action, QUINNIPIAC UNIV.
(June 3, 2009), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/news-and-events/quinnipiac-university-poll
/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=1307, archived at http://perma.cc/H2WF-426Q.
19. Id.
20. Jaschik, supra note 12.
21. Mannion, supra note 12; see also attached appendix.
22. Mariana Lopez-Rosas, Medical School Targets LGBTQ Applicants, YALE DAILY
NEWS (Oct. 25, 2011), http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2011/10/25/medical-school-targets
-lgbtq-applicants/, archived at http://perma.cc/G5P7-T55N.
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This Article explores affirmative action treatment for self-iden-
tified LGBT individuals in college and university admissions. This
Article seeks to explain that while granting affirmative action treat-
ment to self-identified students in the admission process is constitu-
tional, under the current affirmative action precedent, there is a lack
of sufficient justification for such an expansion. This Article will
also explore the advantages and disadvantages should colleges and
universities choose to implement affirmative action programs for
LGBT applicants.
Section I of this Article will begin by depicting the evolution of
affirmative action programs since their inception in the early 1960s.
This section will also include a discussion of relevant Supreme Court
jurisprudence to date (including the Court’s recent rulings in Fisher
v. University of Texas). Section II will discuss the varying views that
support and oppose affirmative action programs and public opinion
concerning affirmative action. Next, Section III will discuss LGBT
civil rights and the strides that the LGBT community has made in
seeking equality (including the Court’s recent decisions in U.S. v.
Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry). Section IV will provide analy-
sis depicting the parallels and pitfalls of arguments supporting and
opposing affirmative action for LGBT individuals. This section will
also include a discussion of the constitutionality of extending these
programs to benefit self-identified LGBT students. This section will
conclude with a discussion of possible pros and cons of extending af-
firmative action benefits to LGBT students.
I. A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN AMERICA
A. Evolution of Affirmative Action Programs
B. Affirmative Action in Colleges and Universities:
1. Regents of University of California v. Bakke
2. Post-Bakke
3. Grutter and Gratz
4. Fisher v. University of Texas
a. The Fifth Circuit Opinion
b. The U.S. Supreme Court Decision
c. Post-Fisher
II. THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE AND PUBLIC OPINION
A. Justification for Affirmative Action
B. Critics of Affirmative Action
C. Public Opinion on Affirmative Action
III. LGBT CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA
A. The Evolution of LGBT Civil Rights
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B. Windsor v. United States: The Demise of DOMA
1. The District Court’s Ruling
2. The Appeals Court’s Ruling
3. The Supreme Court’s Decision
C. Hollingsworth v. Perry: The Fall of Proposition 8
IV. ANALYZING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS THAT BENEFIT
LGBT INDIVIDUALS IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS
A. Origins of Support for Affirmative Action for
LGBT Individuals
B. Analysis in Context of Three Traditional Justifications
for Affirmative Action
1. Remedial Purpose Justification
2. Role Modeling Justification
3. Diversity Justification
C. Constitutionality of Affirmative Action Programs for
LGBT Applicants
1. Appropriate Level of Scrutiny
2. The Need for Programs that Give Affirmative
Action Treatment to LGBT Students
D. Pros and Cons
E. Cautions
CONCLUSION
I. A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN AMERICA
The evolution of affirmative action in America is complex and
muddled with several issues. To add more complexity to the already
murky area of constitutional law, each political party has left its foot-
print in the sand that is currently our affirmative action law. This
section explains how our current affirmative action law has evolved
over the last five decades in an attempt to provide context for the
current affirmative action debate.
A. Evolution of Affirmative Action Programs
What we know today as affirmative action was first termed by
President John F. Kennedy in Executive Order 10925 created on
March 6, 1961.23 President Kennedy used the term to describe gov-
ernment programs designed to remedy past discrimination and cre-
ated the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity
23. Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 8, 1961).
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(PCEEO), which would oversee the practices of government hiring.24
Executive Order 10925 also mandated federal contractors to “take
affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that
employees are treated during employment, without regard to their
race, creed, color, or national origin.” 25 However, this program requir-
ing affirmative action was still unclear.
Shortly after Kennedy’s death, President Lyndon B. Johnson
added much needed clarity to affirmative action. First, President
Johnson signed into law the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which created the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under Title
VII to enforce the employment provision of the Civil Rights Act.26
Later in 1965, President Johnson issued Executive Order 11246
which terminated the PCEEO and transferred the responsibility for
ensuring that all federal contractors comply with affirmative action
to the Department of Labor.27 Highly noteworthy is the fact that
President Johnson justified Executive Order 11246 by stating, “you
do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and
liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say,
‘you are free to compete with all the others,’ and still justly believe
that you have been completely fair.” 28 In 1967, President Johnson
went on to add women to the list of groups under affirmative action
programs.29 Executive Order 11246, as amended by Executive Order
11375, was aimed “to correct the effects of past and present discrimi-
nation.”30 The Order prohibited federal contractors and subcontractors
from discriminating against an employee or applicant for employ-
ment because of race, skin color, religion, gender, or national origin.31
The order required that contractors take affirmative action to en-
sure that the protected class, underutilized applicants were employed
when available, and that employees were treated without negative
discriminatory regard to their protected-class status.32
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1964).
27. Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (Sept. 24, 1965).
28. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement Address at Howard Univ.: “To
Fulfill These Rights” (June 4, 1965). President Johnson also stated “[w]e seek not just
freedom but opportunity. We seek not just legal equity but human ability, not just equality
as a right and a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a result.” Id.
29. Exec. Order No. 11375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14303 (Oct. 13, 1967).
30. William M. Chace, Affirmative Inaction, THE AM. SCHOLAR (Dec. 1, 2011), avail-
able at https://theamericanscholar.org/affirmative-inaction/#.VMFWnd7tDww, archived
at http://perma.cc/8M8D-DG5X.
31. Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319, 12320 (Sept. 24, 1965).
32. Id.
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B. Affirmative Action in Colleges and Universities:
1. Regents of University of California v. Bakke
In 1978, the Supreme Court had its first opportunity to review
affirmative action in the context of higher education. In Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,33 a plurality of the Court held that
the University of California at Davis’s program of quotas for underrep-
resented minorities violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution.34 In that case, a white male student brought an
action after his application to medical school was rejected.35 The ap-
plicant challenged the school’s admission policy of holding 16 of its
100 positions for “disadvantaged” minority students.36 Justice Powell
delivered the splintered decision of the Court and found that the racial
quota was unconstitutional.37 However, Justice Powell asserted that
admissions officers could properly consider applicants’ racial identi-
ties to select student bodies that possess “genuine diversity,” when
race is not the only factor considered. Instead race or ethnic back-
ground is considered a “plus” factor in an applicant’s file, that does not
insulate the applicant from comparison with other candidates.38
Justice Powell held that diversity was a compelling interest, but Jus-
tice Powell added clarity to the term “genuine diversity” by stating,
It is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified
percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be mem-
bers of selected ethnic groups, with the remaining percentage an
undifferentiated aggregation of students. The diversity that fur-
thers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array
of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin
is but a single though important element.39
Justice Powell went on to state that a program that focuses solely
on ethnic diversity would hinder rather than further attainment of
genuine diversity.40
The Bakke decision was a truly complex decision. In fact, it pro-
duced six different opinions41 as the Court grappled with whether all
33. 438 U.S. 265, 266–67 (1979).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 276–77.
36. Id. at 272–75.
37. Id. at 266–67.
38. Id. at 317.
39. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
40. Id. at 318.
41. Id. at 265. Justice Powell’s opinion was joined in part by Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, who also issued a separate joint opinion. Id. at 324–79 (Brennan,
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racial classifications, even those that seek to remedy past discrimi-
nation like affirmative action, are subject to the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review.42 Some Justices recognized that there should be some
other standard of review for racial classification that is not invidious,
but instead seeks to remedy past discrimination.43 Justice Powell’s
opinion struck the perfect middle ground between the two groups; he
held that affirmative action programs were subject to strict scrutiny
and that student diversity was a compelling interest.44
Prior to the Bakke decision, diversity as a compelling interest
was not articulated.45 After the decision, many commentators pointed
to the fact that diversity as a compelling interest was Justice Powell’s
stance and was not shared by the remainder of the four Justices who
concurred in his opinion; therefore, it was not binding precedent.46
Commentators also deeply criticized Justice Powell’s opinion as in
no way precluding admissions officers from continuing to admit minor-
ity students in whatever number they might choose.47 In particular,
Justice Powell’s decision condemned a quota system without truly
defining a quota system.48 Instead, the lingering impression from
the Bakke case is that a quota exists when there is a fixed number
or percentage of seats reserved for minority individuals.49 Thus, it can
be argued that a university is not operating a quota if there is no
fixed number or percentage of minority students in mind. Other com-
mentators took opposition to Justice Powell’s holding that student
“diversity” is a compelling interest.50 As one commentator stated, Jus-
tice Powell’s “academic diversity justification once accepted could, and
should, sustain all forms of special admissions programs designed
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justices
White, Marshall, and Blackmun authored separate opinions arguing that strict scrutiny
should not apply to affirmative action programs. See id. at 379–87 (White, J., concurring);
id. at 387–402 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 402–408 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice
Stevens joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist submitted a
separate opinion. See id. at 408–21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
42. Id. at 290 (majority opinion).
43. Id. at 360 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
44. Id. at 299 (majority opinion).
45. Constitutional Requirements for Affirmative Action in Higher Education Admissions
and Financial Aid, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT- HARV. UNIV. (Sept. 23, 2002), available
at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/legal-developments/legal-memos/constitutional-require
ments-for-affirmative-action-in-higher-education-admissions-and-financial-aid/constitu
tional-affirmative-action-financial-aid.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EXB3-7WNX.
46. James F. Spriggs II & David R. Stras, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO.
L.J. 515, 517 (2011).
47. Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and
the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 922 (1983).
48. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1979).
49. Id.
50. See Mishkin, supra note 47, at 926–29.
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to achieve that objective,” including the very one that the Bakke ruling
had held unconstitutional.51 It has even been stated that the Bakke
decision was a compromise and “amounted to this: ‘You can do
whatever you like in preferring racial minorities, so long as you do
not say so.’ ” 52
2. Post-Bakke
In the years following the Bakke decision, the realm of affirma-
tive action remained murky. Paul J. Mishkin, the senior author of the
University of California’s Supreme Court brief, stated “[t]he experi-
ence following the Bakke decision was that the vast range of race-con-
scious programs of special admissions to universities continued in full
force and effect.” 53 However, with the beginning of the Reagan admin-
istration, the evolution of affirmative action would drastically change.
In the years after Bakke, several important developments oc-
curred. During the Reagan administration, affirmative action was
more politically shaped than ever before. Between 1981 and 1983,
Reagan cut the EEOC and the OFCC budgets by ten percent and
twenty-four percent, respectively, and their staff by twelve percent
and thirty-four percent.54 Also, Reagan shaped the Supreme Court’s
view of affirmative action by appointing at least one Justice who
opposed preferences.55
During that time, the Court began a harsh turn towards ending
affirmative action. First, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education—
just prior to the appointment of Justice Scalia—the Court struck
down the Jackson Board of Education’s policy of laying off, in reverse
seniority, professors in order to ensure that the percentage of minority
teachers equaled the percentage of minority students.56 It became
clear that the policy would result in non-minority teachers with
greater seniority being laid off in higher numbers than minority teach-
ers without seniority.57 The issue resulted in a plurality decision
51. Id. at 929 n.78. The author also states that using Powell’s “plus” programs con-
sidering “the size of the ‘plus’ will set that size in terms of the number of minority students
likely to be produced at the level set.” Id. at 926.
52. John C. Jeffries, Jr., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 484 (Macmillian Publ’g Co.,
1994).
53. Mishkin, supra note 47, at 922.
54. Affirmative Action, INC (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.inc.com/encyclopedia/affirmative
-action.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Q9PW-XY7P.
55. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court: Antonin Scalia, Associate
Justice (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx, archived
at http://perma.cc/J98H-6WF4 (stating that President Reagan appointed Justice Antonin
Scalia).
56. 476 U.S. 267, 283–84 (1986).
57. Id. at 271.
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where a majority of the Court held that the layoff provision was uncon-
stitutional under the strict scrutiny method of review.58 Justice Powell
wrote the plurality decision, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tice Rehnquist. Justice O’Connor only joined in part and wrote a
concurring opinion.59 Justice White also wrote a concurring opinion,
which resulted in the fifth vote need to strike the provision down.60
Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun joined a dissent written by
Justice Marshall.61 Justice Stevens authored his own dissent.62
In the end, the case resulted in a majority holding that curing
societal discrimination and providing role models for minorities
were not sufficient justifications to pass the strict scrutiny standard
of review.63 The majority of the Court took offense to the fact that
the role-modeling theory had no logical stopping point.64 The Court
went on to explain that by tying the discriminatory hiring and firing
policy to the number of minority students, the school would have to
monitor the number of minority faculty every year and make hiring
and firing decisions yearly.65 The Court also held that using affir-
mative action to remedy past discrimination required convincing
evidence that remedial action is warranted.66 However, Justice
O’Connor believed that the “remedial purpose need not be accompa-
nied by contemporaneous findings of actual discrimination to be
accepted as legitimate as long as the public actor has a firm basis
for believing that remedial action is required.” 67
During President Clinton’s administration, there was a five-
month review of federal affirmative action programs.68 The adminis-
tration largely defended affirmative action programs and said that
it was too soon to eliminate the measures.69 During this time, the
Supreme Court decided Adarand Constructors v. Peña, where the
Court held that the strict scrutiny standard of review also applied
to race and ethnicity-based federal affirmative action programs.70
58. See id.
59. Id. at 267.
60. Id. 294–95.
61. Id. at 295–312.
62. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 313.
63. Id. at 274–76.
64. Id. at 275.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 277.
67. Id.at 286 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
68. Ann Devroy, Clinton Study Backs Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, July 19, 1995,
at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/affirm/stories
/aa071995.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/AQN5-GUEV.
69. See PRESIDENT CLINTON’S AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REVIEW 3 (1995) http://clinton2.nara
.gov/WH/EOP/OP/html/aa/aa-index.html, archived at http://perma.cc/PXV2-SJJF.
70. 515 U.S. 200, 200–02 (1995).
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This put an end to the speculation that another standard of review
would apply to so-called benign racial classifications.
However, affirmative action received its most powerful blow in
1996. Proposition 209 was approved by California voters by a mar-
gin of fifty-four to forty-six percent.71 Proposition 209 amended the
California Constitution to prohibit public institutions from giving pref-
erential treatment on the basis of race, sex, or ethnicity.72 Within one
year, the percentage of undergraduates at the University of California
at Berkeley who were Black, Latino, or Native American dropped from
twenty-three to ten percent.73 At Berkeley and UCLA law schools,
Black students’ admissions declined by more than eighty percent,
and Latino admissions declined by half.74
California’s Proposition 209 was just the beginning—other
states began using Proposition 209 as a model to prohibit public insti-
tutions from giving preferential treatment on the basis of race, sex,
or ethnicity.75 First, Washington approved Initiative 200, a statutory
ban on affirmative action programs.76 Then Florida’s “One Florida
Initiative” was approved.77 By this time there was a desperate need
for more guidance on affirmative action in school admissions.
3. Grutter and Gratz
In 2003, the Supreme Court would finally have an opportunity
to add clarity to the highly contested area of affirmative action in uni-
versity and college admissions after the Bakke decision. In 2003, the
71. Samuel Fullwood III & John M. Broder, White House Weighs Suit Over Prop. 209,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 09, 1996), http://articles.latimes.com/1996-11-09/news/mn-63062_1white
-house, archived at http://perma.cc/XZB5-PEKR.
72. Id.
73. James Traub, Class of Prop. 209: In the Wake of Affirmative Action on Campuses,
N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1999, at sm44; see also David Leonhardt, The New Affirmative Action,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007, at E76; Charles R. Lawrence, Two Views of the River: A Critique
of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928, 929 (2001) (stating
that in 1997, only eighteen African American students were admitted at Berkeley Law
School, which was fifty-nine fewer than the prior year—before Proposition 209 passed.
Only one of the eighteen admitted African American students matriculated.).
74. TERRY H. ANDERSON, THE PURSUIT OF FAIRNESS: A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 12, 260 (2004).
75. PRESIDENT CLINTON’S AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REVIEW, supra note 69.
76. In November 1998, voters in the state of Washington passed Initiative Measure
200. The measure provided that “[t]he state shall not discriminate against, or grant pref-
erential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity,
or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public con-
tracting.” WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 49.60.400(1) (West 2002).
77. Fl. Exec. Order No. 99-281 (Nov. 9, 1999) “One Florida Initiative” ended affirmative
action in state schools by implementing reforms in pre-school through 12th grade and by
implementing a top 20% program; see also Sue Anne Pressley, Florida Plan Aims to End
Race-Based Preferences, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 1999, at A15.
614 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 21:603
Supreme Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s af-
firmative action admissions program by a 5–4 margin in Grutter v.
Bollinger.78 In a companion case, the Court struck down as unconsti-
tutional the University of Michigan undergraduate school’s affirma-
tive action program in Gratz v. Bollinger.79
First, in Grutter, the Court reaffirmed diversity as a compelling
interest in upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s ad-
mission policy.80 In that case, Barbara Grutter, a white Michigan resi-
dent, brought suit against the University of Michigan Law School,
alleging racial discrimination based on the school’s rejection of her ap-
plication.81 Grutter also challenged the law school’s use of race; she
claimed it was not supported by a compelling interest to fulfill the
first prong of the strict scrutiny analysis.82 The school’s admission
plan focused primarily on GPA and LSAT scores, but high scores did
not guarantee admission, nor did low scores guarantee rejection.83 The
school also used other variables to achieve a diverse student body.84
Although the law school’s definition of diversity included more factors
than just race, the law school placed a particular emphasis on race.85
In a 5–4 opinion written by Justice O’Connor, the Court held that
the law school’s admission program was constitutional.86 Justice
O’Connor and a majority of the Court “endorse[d] Justice Powell’s
view that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can
justify the use of race in university admissions.” 87 Justice O’Connor
acknowledged that “[n]ot every decision influenced by race is
equally objectionable.” 88 She reiterated the principle that diversity
constitutes a compelling interest when it is more than mere racial
or ethnic diversity.89 She went on to explain the many benefits of a
78. 539 U.S. 306, 306 (2003).
79. 539 U.S. 244, 244 (2003).
80. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306.
81. Id. at 316–17.
82. Id. at 306.
83. Id. at 315 (“In reviewing an applicant’s file, admissions officials must consider
the applicant’s undergraduate grade point average (GPA) and Law School Admission Test
(LSAT) score because they are important (if imperfect) predictors of academic success in
law school. . . . [t]he policy makes clear, however, that even the highest possible score does
not guarantee admission to the Law School.”).
84. Id. at 315 (“The hallmark of [the] policy is its focus on academic ability coupled with
a flexible assessment of applicants’ talents, experiences, and potential ‘to contribute to the
learning of those around them.’ ”).
85. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316 (“reaffirm[ing] the Law School’s longstanding commitment
to . . . racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of . . . African-
Americans, Hispanics, and Native-Americans.”).
86. See id.
87. Id. at 308, 328 (“Today, we hold that the Law School has a compelling interest in
attaining a diverse student body.”).
88. Id. at 308.
89. Id.
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diverse student body.90 She also stated that while diversity is a
compelling interest, race cannot be used as a decisive factor; how-
ever, race can be a factor considered in the “holistic” review of an indi-
vidual applicant.91
In applying the strict scrutiny standard and the principles men-
tioned above in the Grutter case, Justice O’Connor held that the law
school use of race served a compelling interest and was narrowly
tailored because it seriously weighed many factors, including race.92
Justice O’Connor also held that there were no other race-neutral
alternatives available to the law school.93 She explained that “[n]arrow
tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral
alternative or mandate that a university choose between maintain-
ing a reputation for excellence and fulfilling a commitment to provide
educational opportunities to members of all racial groups.” 94 In-
stead, the Court held that all that was required is a “serious, good
faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will
achieve the diversity that the university seeks.” 95 Additionally, Justice
O’Connor also held that the admissions program was narrowly
tailored, and it did not unduly burden students that were not members
of a racial or ethnic group “[b]ecause the Law School considers ‘all
pertinent elements of diversity,’ it can (and does) select nonminority
applicants who have greater potential to enhance student body di-
versity over underrepresented minority applicants.” 96 While it was
argued that the law school’s attention to percentage of minority stu-
dents in achieving its “critical mass” was unconstitutional as a quota,
Justice O’Connor dismissed this argument stating, “attention to num-
bers, without more, does not transform a flexible admissions system
into a rigid quota.” 97 Justice O’Connor went on to define a quota
90. Id. at 330–33.
91. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (stating that to comply with narrow tailoring “a race-con-
scious admissions program cannot use a quota system—it cannot ‘insulat[e] each category
of applicant with certain desired qualifications from competition with all other appli-
cants.’ ”) (quoting Justice Powell in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315)).
92. Id. at 309 (“[T]he Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of
each applicant’s file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might con-
tribute to a diverse educational environment.”).
93. Id. at 309 (“[N]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-
neutral alternative.”). Justice O’Connor went on to state that “the Law School sufficiently
considered workable race-neutral alternatives” because other alternatives “would require
a dramatic sacrifice of diversity, the academic quality of all admitted students, or both.”
Id. at 340.
94. Id. at 309.
95. Id. at 339 (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1988)).
96. Id. at 341 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. 317).
97. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336 (rebutting Justice Kennedy’s position that the law school’s
consultation of the ‘daily reports,’ which keep track of the racial and ethnic composition
of the class (as well of residency and gender), ‘sugges[t] there was no further attempt at
individual review save for race itself’ during the final stages of the admission process”).
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system by expanding on the Bakke holding. She distinguished a quota
system from a goal by stating, “[p]roperly understood, a ‘quota’ is a
program in which a certain fixed number or proportion of opportuni-
ties are ‘reserved exclusively for certain minority groups.’ . . . In con-
trast, ‘a permissible goal . . . require[s] only a good-faith effort . . . to
come within a range demarcated by the goal itself.’ ” 98
Of course, Grutter was not without its dissenters. In his dissent,
Justice Kennedy noted the importance of limited (or no) deference
to universities when race is used; he stated that this would ensure
that “[p]rospective students, the courts, and the public can demand
that the State and its law schools prove their process is fair and con-
stitutional in every phase of implementation.” 99 Justice Kennedy
seemed to be very cautious about the extreme deference given to the
Law School and the procedures used to accomplish student diversity.
While he endorsed diversity as a compelling government interest,
he (and Justice Rehnquist) believed that deference to the law school’s
procedures was contrary to the strict scrutiny standard, and did not
force the school to prove that its procedures were constitutional and
narrowly tailored to meet the compelling interest of diversity.100 He
understood the Court’s holding as inconsistent with the holding in
Bakke.101 He believed that the safeguard provided when using race
as a factor was the rigorous review under strict scrutiny and the nar-
rowly tailoring component.102 He declared that this rigorous review
could not be accomplished while giving extreme deference to the law
school’s procedures.103 Justice Kennedy stated that “[t]he Court [had]
confuse[d] deference to a university’s definition of its educational
objective with deference to the implementation of this goal.”104 Justice
Kennedy believed that there should be no deference given to the law
school in determining the best way to accomplish diversity.105
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy also seemed skeptical about the
Court’s distinction between a quota and the “critical mass” that the
law school had aspired to obtain.106 Justice Kennedy believed that
there was no difference between the term “critical mass,” which had
no numerical value attached to it, and a quota system that sought a
particular number or percentage of students.107 He stated, “the concept
98. Id. at 335 (internal citations omitted).
99. Id. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 388–90.
101. Id. at 389.
102. Id.
103. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 389.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 389.
107. Id. at 389.
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of critical mass is a delusion used by the Law School to mask its at-
tempt to make race an automatic factor in most instances and to
achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas.”108
Justice Scalia “piggy-backed” off this skepticism in his dissent—
joined by Justice Thomas—where he questioned when a “critical
mass” becomes a quota system.109 He stated, “[s]ome future lawsuits
will presumably focus on whether a university has gone beyond the
bounds of a ‘good-faith effort’ and has so zealously pursued its ‘criti-
cal mass’ as to make it an unconstitutional de facto quota system,
rather than merely ‘a permissible goal.’ ”110 Justice Scalia believed that
the absence of a bright-line rule (either holding that racial preferences
were either permissible or impermissible) would prolong the litiga-
tion with regards to affirmative action.111 However, the Court would
add more clarity in Gratz, the companion decision.
In Gratz v. Bollinger (the simpler of the two cases), two unsuc-
cessful white applicants, one female and one male, to the University
of Michigan’s undergraduate program filed suit claiming that the
school’s use of race in the admission process was unconstitutional.112
The university’s admission procedure was based upon an index where
each student was awarded a maximum of 150 points.113 Points were
distributed based on an applicants’ high school GPA, standardized
test scores, relationship with alumni, and Michigan residency, among
other things.114 However, more importantly, an applicant was awarded
twenty points if he or she was a member of an “underrepresented ra-
cial or ethnic minority group.”115
Ultimately, a majority of the Court held that the university’s ad-
mission policy was not narrowly tailored and was therefore unconsti-
tutional.116 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated
that while race may be considered in admission policies, it cannot be
a decisive factor.117 Justice Rehnquist declared, “the University’s pol-
icy, which automatically distributes twenty points, or one-fifth of
108. Id. (joining Chief Justice Rehnquist in his assertion that the “critical mass” goal
is merely a quota). Id. at 380–81.
109. Grutter, 389 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110. Id. (declaring that, “[u]nlike a clear constitutional holding that racial preferences
in state educational institutions are impermissible, or even a clear anticonstitutional
holding that racial preferences in state educational institutions are OK, today’s Grutter-
Gratz split double header seems perversely designed to prolong the controversy and the
litigation.” Justice Scalia went on to discuss issues in future litigation.).
111. Id.
112. 539 U.S. 244, 251–52 (2003).
113. Id. at 253–56.
114. Id. at 255.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 275–76.
117. Id. at 270–71.
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the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single ‘underrep-
resented minority’ applicant solely because of race, is not narrowly
tailored to achieve the interest in educational diversity.”118 The addi-
tion of twenty points to a minority student’s file created a decisive
factor that almost guaranteed admission for a minority student.119
The Court believed that the case was the exact opposite of what Jus-
tice Powell had explained would be constitutional in Bakke.120 Jus-
tice Rehnquist stated, “unlike Justice Powell’s example, where the
race of a ‘particular black applicant’ could be considered without being
decisive, the [school’s] automatic distribution of 20 points has the ef-
fect of making ‘the factor of race . . . decisive’ for virtually every mini-
mally qualified underrepresented minority applicant.”121
Moreover, the Chief Justice stated that Powell’s opinion “did not
contemplate that any single characteristic automatically ensured a
specific and identifiable contribution to a university’s diversity. In-
stead, under the approach Justice Powell described, each character-
istic of a particular applicant was to be considered in assessing the
applicant’s entire application.”122 The fatal blow to the undergradu-
ate admission policy in the Gratz case was the fact that the majority
felt that it did not take into account a holistic view of the applicant;
instead, as Chief Justice Rehnquist put it, the award of twenty points
for minority status had “the effect of making ‘the factor of race . . .
decisive.’ ”123 This lack of individualized consideration of each appli-
cant worked to disadvantage applicants not from an underrepre-
sented minority, which was unconstitutional.124
In a dissent by Justice Souter, which was joined by Justice
Ginsburg, it was argued that the undergraduate school’s admission
policy should be constitutional when compared to that of the Law
School’s policy.125 Justice Souter stated that the undergraduate
program was “closer to what Grutter approves than to what Bakke
condemns, and should not be held unconstitutional on the current
record.”126 Justice Souter went on to compare the undergraduate
118. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270.
119. Id. at 271–72.
120. Id. at 270–72.
121. Id. at 272 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317) (internal citation omitted) (holding that
the University’s admission policy did not provide individuals consideration).
122. Id. at 271 (citation omitted) (holding that Justice Powell’s Bakke decision “empha-
sized the importance of considering each particular applicant as an individual, assessing
all of the qualities that individual possesses, and in turn, evaluating that individual’s abil-
ity to contribute to the unique setting of higher education”).
123. Id. at 272.
124. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275–76.
125. Id. at 293 (Souter, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (stating that “[t]he record does not describe a system with a quota like the one
struck down in Bakke, which insulate[d] all nonminority candidates from competition
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program used by the University of Michigan with the set-aside pro-
gram used in Bakke. Souter noted that in Gratz the program utilized
allowed all applicants to compete for all places available and evalu-
ated the applicant’s offering for any place not only on grounds of race,
but on grades, test scores, strength of high school, residence, alumni
relationships, leadership, and socioeconomic disadvantage, among
other things.127 He stated that “[a] nonminority applicant who scores
highly in these other categories can readily garner a selection index
exceeding that of a minority applicant who gets the 20-point bonus.”128
To Justice Souter the award of the additional twenty points was not
the equivalent of setting aside seats for minority students; instead,
it was very similar (if not identical) to the “plus” factor identified in
Grutter.129 Justice Souter asserted, “[t]he college simply does by a
numbered scale what the law school accomplishes in its ‘holistic re-
view.’ ”130 Justice Souter believed that simply adding a numerical
value to the “plus” factor should not be fatal.
In a separate dissent, Justice Ginsburg reaffirmed the idea of af-
firmative action as a remedy for past racial discrimination. She stated,
[t]o avoid conflict with the equal protection clause, a classification
that denies a benefit, causes harm, or imposes a burden must not
be based on race. In that sense, the Constitution is color blind. But
the Constitution is color conscious to prevent discrimination being
perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination.131
In applying these principles, the admission policy did not re-
serve seats on the basis of race, which would have caused harm to non-
minority applicants.132 Also, the policy did not limit the enrollment
from certain seats.”). Justice Souter went on to explain that “[t]he Bakke plan ‘focused
solely on ethnic diversity’ and effectively told nonminority applicants that ‘[n]o matter how
strong their qualifications, quantitative and extracurrular, including their own potential
for contribution to educational diversity, they are never afforded a chance to compete with
applicants from the preferred groups for the [set-aside] special admissions seats,” as op-
posed to the plan in Gratz that lets all applicants compete for all seats). Id. (citing Bakke,
438 U.S. at 319.).
127. Id. at 293–94.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 295.
130. Gratz, 539 U.S. at295. (explaining that “Justice Powell’s ‘plus’ factors necessarily
are assigned some values”).
131. Id. at 301–02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Jefferson Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir. 1996)) (“Our jurisprudence ranks race a ‘suspect’
category, ‘not because [race] is inevitably an impressible classification, but because it is one
which usually, to our national shame, has been drawn for the purpose of maintaining racial
inequality.’ ”). She went on to explain that “where race is considered ‘for the purpose of
achieving equality,’ no automatic proscription is in order.” Id. at 301 (citation omitted).
132. Id. at 303.
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of minority applicants, which would have caused harm to minority
candidates.133 Finally, non-minority students were not affected by
being excluded from seats, which means there was no undue burden
imposed upon them.134 To Justice Ginsburg, this made the policy
constitutional.135
Both Justice Souter and Ginsburg seemed to appreciate the fully
disclosed affirmative action program used by the University of Michi-
gan. Justice Souter compared the program with the percentage re-
quirements used in some states at the time by stating that those
systems “are just as race conscious as the point scheme (and fairly
so), but they get their racially diverse results without directly say-
ing what they are doing and why they are doing it. . . . Equal protec-
tion cannot become an exercise in which the winners are the ones
who hide the ball.”136 Justice Ginsburg also warned of clandestine
affirmative action programs. Justice Ginsburg stated, “Michigan’s
accurately described, fully disclosed College affirmative action pro-
gram is preferable to achieving similar numbers through winks,
nods, and disguises.”137 She warned that “[o]ne can reasonably an-
ticipate . . . that colleges and universities will seek to maintain their
minority enrollment—and the networks and opportunities thereby
opened to minority graduates—whether or not they can do so in full
candor through adoption of affirmative action plans of the kind here
at issue. Without recourse to such plans, institutions of higher edu-
cation may resort to camouflage.”138
The Grutter and Gratz cases provided the landscape with some (as
much as possible) clarity on affirmative action programs in college
and universities’ admission programs. We now know that diversity
is officially a compelling interest, which will pass the strict scrutiny
level of review. Race can be used as a “plus” factor in an applicant’s
file. While race may be used in admission policies as one factor among
many, it still may not be a decisive factor. Finally, the Court favors
a holistic review of individual applicants and will strike down an auto-
matic award of a certain number of points to an applicant who is a
member of a particular racial group. However, the Court’s opinion
seems to indicate that the notion of penalizing candor where affir-
mative action programs are concerned still remains. Particularly
interesting is the idea that “[y]ou can do whatever you like in prefer-
ring racial minorities, so long as you do not say so” still seems to
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 302–03.
136. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298.
137. Id. at 305.
138. Id. at 304.
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remain a part of the precedent.139 Finally, it seems that the Court
gives great deference to procedures using race, as long as those pro-
cedures do not mention how race is used. In Grutter, the exact way
race was used in the admission process was unknown, and the Court
gave deference to the school’s procedures. While in Bakke and Gratz,
the mention of a set-aside or extra points awarded because of race
was granted no deference.
4. Fisher v. University of Texas
Race-conscious student admissions in colleges and universities
would stay off the Court’s radar until 10 years later, in 2013, when
the Court decided to hear Fisher v. University of Texas.140 The Fisher
case was created in the wake of Hopwood v. Texas, which was over
turned by Grutter.141 Before Hopwood, the University of Texas at
Austin (U.T. Austin) used two different factors to determine admis-
sions: first, a student’s Academic Index (AI) that included the stu-
dent’s academic achievements and test scores; second, the applicant’s
race.142 This resulted in an entering class that was 4.1% African
American and 14.5% Hispanic.143 However, in Hopwood, the Fifth
Circuit held that race-conscious admission policies were unconstitu-
tional.144 After Hopwood, the U.T. Austin stopped using race and
instead relied on a Personal Achievement Index (PAI), which consid-
ered various factors including work experience, awards, community
service, and leadership skills.145 Under the last year of this plan,
U.T. Austin had an entering class that was 4.5% African American
and 16.9% Hispanic.146 In response to Hopwood, the Texas Legislature
created the Texas Top Ten Percent Plan (the “Plan”), which required
that the top ten percent of students graduating from each public high
school be guaranteed admission to any public state college, including
the University of Texas.147 After the legislature enacted the Plan, U.T.
Austin began using the Plan.
However, in 2003, the University of Texas Board of Regents
authorized the institutions within the University of Texas system
139. David J. Garrow, The Evolution of Affirmative Action and the Necessity of Truly In-
dividualized Admissions Decisions, 34 J.C. & U.L. 1, 12 (2007) (quoting JOHN C. JEFFERIES,
JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 484 (1994)).
140. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
141. Id. at 2416 (stating that Grutter upheld the use of race as one of many “plus factors”
in an admissions program).
142. Id. at 2415.
143. Id. at 2416.
144. Id. at 2415; see also Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 962 (1996).
145. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2415–16.
146. Id. at 2416.
147. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (1997).
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to examine “ ‘whether to consider an applicant’s race and ethnicity’ ”
in admissions “ ‘in accordance with the standards enunciated in
Grutter.’ ”148 U.T. Austin employed two studies considering the mi-
nority enrollment at U.T. Austin. First, minority representation was
studied in undergraduate classes containing between five to twenty-
four students.149 The study showed that ninety percent of smaller
classes in the Fall of 2002 had either one or zero African-American
students, forty-six percent had one or zero Asian-American students,
and forty-three percent had one or zero Hispanic students.150 A more
focused round of study excluded the smallest of classes, only focusing
on classes with ten to twenty-four students; this study found that
eighty-nine percent of those classes had either one or zero African-
American students, forty-one had one or zero Asian-American
students, and thirty-seven percent had either one or zero Hispanic
students.151 A second study surveyed students and asked their im-
pressions on diversity on the campus.152 Minority students reported
feeling isolated,153 and a majority of the student body reported that
“there was ‘insufficient minority representation’ in classrooms for ‘the
full benefits of diversity to occur.’154 U.T. Austin incorporated these
findings into a June 2004 internal document entitled The Proposal
to Consider Race and Ethnicity in Admissions (the “Proposal”).155 The
Proposal explained that U.T. Austin had not reached the “critical
mass” of minority students needed to benefit from student diversity.156
The Proposal went on to recommend that the consideration of race be
used as one additional factor within the PAI score, to remedy the lack
of a “critical mass.”157 In 2004, U.T. Austin adopted a policy to include
race as one of the many factors considered in admissions.158 Race is not
assigned a specific numerical value, but race was a significant factor.159
After the reintroduction of race, U.T. Austin enrollment of Afri-
can-American students doubled from 165 to 335 students; Hispanic
148. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 225 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing to the
Minutes of the Board of Regents of the University of Texas at Austin, Meeting No. 969,
August 6–7, 2003).
149. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2416.
150. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 225.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. (discussing that single minority students were thought to be just as troubling
as classes with zero students of that minority because a single minority student is apt
to feel isolated or like a spokesperson for his or her race).
154. Id.
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students’ enrollment increased from 762 students to 1,228 students;
and Asian-American students’ enrollment increased from 1,034 to
1,126.160 By contrast in 2004, the last year without the use of race
in the PAI score, there were only 275 African-American students and
1,024 Hispanic students.161
Abigail Fisher applied for admission to the University in 2008
and was rejected.162 She brought suit to challenge the University’s use
of race in the admission process as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.163 The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.164
The District Court granted the University’s motion of summary judg-
ment stating that there was no genuine issue of material fact, and
that the University was entitled to judgment as a matter of law
because its decision to consider race in the admissions process was
supported by a compelling interest in diversity and the use of race
was narrowly tailored.165 The district court relied heavily on the fact
that the University’s admission plan resembled the University of
Michigan plan that the Court upheld in Grutter; stating, “the Court
has difficulty imagining an admissions policy that could more closely
resemble the Michigan Law School’s admissions policy upheld and ap-
proved by the Supreme Court in Grutter.”166 Ms. Fisher appealed.167
a. The Fifth Circuit Opinion
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court de-
cision.168 Justice Higginbotham, writing for the unanimous court,
held that the University’s use of race was constitutional because it
was supported by a compelling interest in achieving student diver-
sity, that narrow tailoring did not require the University to exhaust
the Top Ten Percent Law, and that the University had not reached
or surpassed a critical mass of underrepresented minority stu-
dents.169 The plaintiffs first argued that Grutter does not extend
deference to a “university’s decision to implement a race-conscious
admissions policy,” whether the school had “attained a critical mass
of minority students,” or whether “race-conscious efforts were neces-
sary” to achieve the benefits that derived from a diverse student
160. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 226.
161. Id.
162. Fisher, 133 S.Ct. at 2413.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 613 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
166. Id. at 612.
167. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 213.
168. Id. at 247.
169. See id.
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body.170 However, the court found that proposition belied the holding
in Grutter, instead finding that “the narrow-tailoring inquiry—like
the compelling-interest inquiry—is undertaken with a degree of def-
erence to the University’s . . . expert academic judgment.”171
Next, the plaintiffs challenged the University’s need to resort to
a race-conscious admissions policy; arguing: (1) the University at-
tempted to achieve “racial balancing”; (2) the University did not give
adequate consideration to “race-neutral alternatives like the Top
Ten Percent Law; and (3) the University had already surpassed a
“critical mass.”172
In addressing racial balancing, the court began by explaining that
the University’s system was modeled after the system approved in
Grutter, and that the University “never established a specific num-
ber, percentage, or range of minority enrollment that would consti-
tute ‘critical mass,’ nor does it award any fixed number of points to
minority students in a way that impermissibly values race for its
own sake.”173 The plaintiffs argued that the University’s program
amounted to racial balancing because it “evinces a special concern
for demographically underrepresented groups, while neglecting the
diverse contributions of others.”174 However, the court held that this
was contrary to the evidence because race could “enhance the [PAI]
score of a student from any racial background, including whites and
Asian-Americans.”175 Furthermore, the court held that even though
the University made reference to state population data to justify the
adoption of the race-conscious admissions measures, Bakke and
Grutter recognized that “there is of course ‘some relationship be-
tween numbers and achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse
student body.’ ”176 The court held that the University had reached
the conclusion that it would benefit from a critical mass of underrep-
resented minorities and that references to the state demographics was
necessary to determine which backgrounds were underrepresented.177
Next, the plaintiffs contended that the Top Ten Percent Law was
“a facially race-neutral alternative that would allow [the University]
to obtain a critical mass of minority enrollment without resorting to
race-conscious admissions.”178 The court responded to this argument
170. Id. at 232.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 234.
173. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 235.
174. Id. at 235–36.
175. Id. at 236.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 237.
178. Id. at 239.
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by finding, as the Court did in Grutter, that percentage plans were
not “a workable alternative—at least in a constitutionally significant
sense—because ‘they may preclude the university from conducting
the individualized assessments necessary to assemble a student body
that is . . . diverse along all the qualities valued by the university.’ ”179
The court went on to explain that even though the Top Ten Percent
Law did increase minority student enrollment, it did not produce
the educational benefits that the University sought to accomplish.180
Finally, the plaintiff argued that the University’s “decision to
reintroduce race-conscious admissions was unconstitutional because
minority enrollment already met or exceeded ‘critical mass.’ ”181 The
plaintiff posited the argument on raw percentages of minorities en-
rolled, arguing that if 13.5 to 20.1% minority enrollment was suffi-
cient diversity in Grutter, the 21.4% enrollment the University had
obtained before the reintroduction of race was sufficient for critical
mass.182 The court held that this reasoning was flawed because
“looking to aggregate minority enrollment . . . lumps together dis-
tinct minority groups from different backgrounds who may bring
various unique contributions to the University environment.”183 The
court held that “[a]lthough the aggregate number of underrepresented
minorities may be large, the enrollment statistics for individual
groups when [the University] decided to reintroduce race . . . [did] not
indicate critical mass was achieved.”184 The court also recognized
that the University had “given appropriate consideration to whether
aggregate minority enrollment [had] translat[ed] into adequate di-
versity in the classroom.”185
Justice Garza wrote a concurring opinion that painted the Grutter
decision as a detour from the principle of strict scrutiny, which the
court had to unfortunately faithfully apply.186 In his concurrence—
which was reminiscent of Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter—
Justice Garza began by revisiting the principles of strict scrutiny.187
In particular, he concentrated on the Fifth Circuit’s deference in
Grutter to the university administrators’ judgment on how to best
achieve racial diversity, and the Supreme Court’s divergence from
179. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 239.
180. Id. at 240–41 (explaining that minority students were still clustered into certain
programs limiting the diverse interactions in the classroom setting).
181. Id. at 242–43.
182. Id. at 243.
183. Id. at 245.
184. Id.
185. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 245.
186. Id. at 247 (Garza, J., concurring).
187. Id.
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the narrow tailoring requirement.188 Justice Garza argued that “the
deference called for in Grutter seems to allow universities, rather than
the courts, to determine when the use of racial preferences is no
longer compelling.”189 Furthermore, Justice Garza argued that under
the new narrow tailoring requirement articulated by the Court in
Grutter, only serious, good faith consideration of workable race-
neutral alternatives are required; and that so long as universities
have given “serious, good faith consideration” to race-neutral means,
“universities are no longer required to use the most effective race-
neutral means.”190 Justice Garza also took offense to the Supreme
Court’s conclusion that student body diversity was a compelling in-
terest under strict scrutiny.191
b. The U.S. Supreme Court Decision
Following the circuit court’s decision, the Supreme Court granted
the plaintiff’s writ of certiorari in 2012 to determine whether the lower
courts’ rulings were consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.192 In a 7–1 decision written by Justice Kennedy, Justice Kagan
took no part in the opinion, the Supreme Court reached the conclusion
that the lower courts had inappropriately applied the strict scrutiny
standard of review.193
In writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy began by explaining
the Court’s relevant precedent on race-conscious admission pro-
grams.194 He first addressed Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke. Justice
Kennedy reiterated that in Bakke, the Court reached the conclusion
that all racial classification, including benign classifications, are sub-
ject to strict scrutiny, requiring a compelling governmental interest
and narrow tailoring to serve that compelling interest.195 Justice
Kennedy went on to explain that “Justice Powell identified one
compelling interest that could justify the consideration of race: the
interest in the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student
body.”196 However, Justice Kennedy made sure to explain that “[i]t
is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity . . . . The diversity that
furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array
188. Id. at 249.
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 250–51.
191. Fisher, 613 F.3d at 255–56 (Garza, J., concurring).
192. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013).
193. Id. at 2421–22.
194. Id. at 2415–17.
195. Id. at 2417.
196. Id.
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of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin
is but a single though important element.”197
Next Justice Kennedy moved on to the Grutter and Gratz deci-
sions. He began by explaining that Grutter and Gratz endorsed the
opinion in Bakke by affirming Justice Powell’s conclusion that obtain-
ing the educational benefits of a diverse student body “is a compelling
state interest that can justify the use of race in university admis-
sions.”198 However, he qualified this principle by stating that “[r]ace
may not be considered unless the admissions process can withstand
strict scrutiny.”199 He further explained that in Gratz, the Court noted
that “[n]othing in Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke signaled that a
university may employ whatever means it desires to achieve the
stated goal of diversity without regard to the limits imposed by our
strict scrutiny analysis.” 200 Justice Kennedy also pointed out that the
Grutter opinion holds that “[t]o be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious
admissions program cannot use a quota system, but instead must
‘remain flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated
as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or
ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application.’ ” 201 Justice
Kennedy ended by reiterating the flawed reasoning in Grutter by stat-
ing, “[a]ccording to Grutter, a university’s ‘educational judgment that
such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which
we defer.” 202
Justice Kennedy began his discussion of the flaw in the District
Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding by summarizing
the relevant law. He stated that once the University states that it
is pursuing the compelling interest of student diversity for the purpose
of strict scrutiny, “there must still be a further judicial determination
that the admissions process meets strict scrutiny in its implementa-
tion.” 203 He reiterated that this requires that “[t]he University must
prove that the means chosen . . . to attain diversity are narrowly
tailored to that goal. On this point, the University receives no defer-
ence.” 204 He also pointed out that according to Bakke, narrow tailoring
requires “a reviewing court to verify that it is ‘necessary’ for a univer-
sity to use race to achieve the educational benefits of diversity.” 205 He
further stated, “[narrow tailoring] involves a careful judicial inquiry
197. Id. at 2418 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978)).
198. Fisher, 133 S.Ct. at 2418.
199. Id.
200. Id. (citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275).
201. Id. (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334).
202. Id. at 2419 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328).
203. Id. at 2419.
204. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420.
205. Id. at 2414.
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into whether a university could achieve sufficient diversity without
using racial classification.” 206 Citing Grutter, he explained that “[a]l-
though ‘[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every con-
ceivable race-neutral alternative’, strict scrutiny does require a court
to examine with care, and not to defer to, a university’s ‘serious, good
faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives.’ ” 207 Essen-
tially, this meant that “[t]he reviewing court must ultimately be satis-
fied that no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the
educational benefits of diversity.” 208 If race-neutral means could ac-
complish the interest in student diversity about as well, then the uni-
versity could not resort to consideration of race.209
Justice Kennedy went on to demonstrate that the District Court
and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had not held the university to
strict scrutiny.210 Instead, he found that the Fifth Circuit “held peti-
tioner could challenge only ‘whether [the University’s] decision to re-
introduce race as a factor in admissions was made in good faith.’ ” 211
Furthermore, in considering a challenge to the good faith of the uni-
versity, the Fifth Circuit “[presumed] the University acted in good
faith and place[d] on petitioner the burden of rebutting that presump-
tion.” 212 Justice Kennedy found that the Fifth Circuit’s decision to
grant a degree of deference to the University in the narrow-tailoring
requirement was at odds with the commands of strict scrutiny, which
requires the University demonstrate that available, workable race-
neutral alternatives did not suffice before resorting to race.213 Justice
Kennedy stated, “Grutter did not hold that good faith would forgive
an impermissible consideration of race.” 214 He went on to explain that
because the District Court and the Fifth Circuit had deferred to the
University’s good faith in its use of racial classification to affirm the
grant of summary judgment, it had not applied strict scrutiny.215 The
decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was vacated and the case
was remanded to determine whether the University’s use of race was
narrowly tailored.216
A key point in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion is that “[t]he
parties asked the Court to review whether the judgment below was
206. Id. at 2420.
207. Id. (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339–40).
208. Id. at 2414.
209. Id. at 2420 (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. 267, 280 n. 6).
210. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2414.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 2420.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 2421.
215. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421.
216. Id.
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consistent with ‘this Court’s decisions interpreting the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including Grutter.” 217
Justice Kennedy pointed out at least two times in the opinion that the
parties did not ask the Court to revisit its approval of diversity as
a compelling interest for strict scrutiny in Grutter.218 This signaled
that the Court was not prepared to overrule its holding in Grutter.
However, this was indeed a point of contention.
Justice Scalia reiterated in his concurrence his view that “[t]he
Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of
race, and state-provided education is no exception”; however, Justice
Scalia did agree that the “petitioner in this case did not ask [the
Court] to overrule Grutter’s holding that a ‘compelling interest’ in the
educational benefits of diversity can justify racial preferences in uni-
versity admissions.” 219 Justice Thomas explained that while he
agreed that the lower courts did not apply strict scrutiny, he would
“overrule [Grutter], and hold that a State’s use of race in higher edu-
cation admissions decisions is categorically prohibited by the Equal
Protection Clause.” 220 He first posited this argument by explaining
how Grutter was a “radical” departure from the Court’s strict scrutiny
precedent.221 He explained that in his view the Court has only allowed
racial classifications to protect national security and to remedy past
discrimination citing Korematsu v. United States and Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co.222 He then compared the University’s argument that
it had a compelling interest in the educational benefits of diversity
to the alleged educational benefits of segregation, which were held to
be insufficient to justify racial discrimination.223 He further explained
that the University’s consideration of race injured white and Asian ap-
plicants, but more importantly it also injured the Black and Hispanic
students admitted to the university.224 In his view, these students
were ill-prepared when compared to their white and Asian counter-
parts.225 He ended with reiterating that race-conscious admissions
“stamp[s] [blacks and Hispanics] with a badge of inferiority.” 226
217. Id. at 2415.
218. Id. at 2419 (explaining that “[t]here is disagreement about whether Grutter was
consistent with the principles of equal protection in approving this compelling interest in
diversity[,] [b]ut the parties here do not ask the Court to revisit that aspect of Grutter’s
holding”) (citations omitted).
219. Id. at 2422 (Scalia, J., concurring).
220. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
221. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422–23.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 2424–25.
224. Id. at 2431.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 2432.
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Justice Ginsburg was the only dissenting Justice in this case.
She agreed that the Court was right to not reconsider Grutter’s com-
pelling interest in diversity.227 She took offense to the petitioner’s
argument that Texas’ Top Ten Percent Law was a race-neutral
alternative.228 She explained that the Top Ten Percent Law was not
race-neutral because it “was adopted with racially segregated neigh-
borhoods and schools front and center stage.” 229 She also took of-
fense to the petitioner’s argument that race-blind holistic review was
an adequate race-neutral alternative.230 She once again cautioned
that “if universities cannot explicitly include race as a factor, many
may ‘resort to camouflage’ to ‘maintain their minority enrollment.’ ” 231
She dissented because she would not have vacated the Fifth Circuit’s
judgment and would not have remanded the case.232 Justice Ginsburg
concluded that the Fifth Circuit had adequately applied the strict scru-
tiny test in accord with the Bakke and Grutter opinions, and that the
University’s admission policy had met those requirements.233 The
University was seeking the educational benefits that flowed from
student diversity (which qualifies as a compelling interest).234 Fur-
thermore, she explained that the University’s use of race was nar-
rowly tailored because it did not make race a determinative factor;
it gave good faith consideration of the Top Ten Percent Law when
it conducted the two 2003 studies that resulted in the conclusion
that the Top Ten Percent law was insufficient to produce the neces-
sary diversity.235
c. Post-Fisher
The Fisher opinion represents a well negotiated and crafted deci-
sion. The opinion brought both conservative Justices and liberal Jus-
tices together to decide a central point: that strict scrutiny was not
correctly applied in the lower courts.236 Before the Court’s ruling,
Fisher was believed to be the dreaded end of affirmative action in
college and university admissions programs. Many feared that the
Court would overrule its holding in Grutter and find that the use of
227. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2434 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 2433.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 2433.
232. Id.
233. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2434 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 2414 (demonstrating that the majority opinion included conservative justices
such as Thomas, Scalia, Alito, and Roberts).
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race-conscious admissions programs was unconstitutional.237 Even
though at least two concurring Justices indicated that they were pre-
pared to overrule Grutter,238 the Court’s ruling left a glimmer of hope
for universities and colleges that used affirmative action programs
in their admissions process. In fact, both proponents and opponents
of affirmative action programs were claiming victory.239 Proponents
lived to fight another day while opponents believe that the hurdle col-
leges and universities must pass to use race has gotten higher.240
Essentially, the Court held that strict scrutiny is in fact strict scru-
tiny and all requirements—even the necessary requirement—must
be met.241 As the case heads back to the lower courts, everyone is still
left in the dark about the impact that Fisher will have on the use of
race in college and university admissions.
II. THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE AND PUBLIC OPINION
A. Justification for Affirmative Action
Since its birth in the 1960s, affirmative action has been a divisive
and intensely debated subject. Affirmative action programs have
never had overwhelming support; there is even a segment of opposi-
tion among those whom these programs seek to benefit.242 While
affirmative action programs have been diluted over time, they still
remain a part of college and university admission policies.243
Supporters of affirmative action programs in college and univer-
sity admissions put forth several rationales. Most of these rationales
are related to and can be summed up with the quote from President
Lyndon B. Johnson: “[y]ou do not take a person who, for years, has
been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the start-
ing line of a race and then say, ‘you are free to compete with all the
others’ and still justly believe that you have been completely fair.”244
First, supporters justify affirmative action as a means for remedying
237. See Adam Liptak, Justices Weigh Race as Factor at Universities, N.Y. TIMES,
October 11, 2012, at A1.
238. Id.
239. John Schwartz & Richard Pérez-Pena, Lacking Definitive Ruling, Both Sides
Claim Victory, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2013, at A12.
240. Id.
241. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421.
242. Brown, supra note 18 (stating that 55% of Americans find that affirmative action
should be abolished. Twenty-six percent of black voters oppose affirmative action).
243. See Mary Beth Marklein, Colleges Can Still Use Race for Admissions—But Care-
fully, USA TODAY (June 24, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06
/24/affirmative-action-universities-admissions-supreme-court/2452703/, archived at http:
//perma.cc/V3RL-VDWM.
244. Johnson, supra note 28.
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past discrimination and persecution for groups that have been op-
pressed or victimized by a dominant majority.245 As Professor Peter
Schuck put it, “[t]he restitution rationale applies with special force,
of course, to blacks whose ancestors were brought to the United States
in chains and suffered unspeakable degradation over many genera-
tions, including the era of Jim Crow that ended as recently as the
1950s and 1960s.” 246 This remedial, or restitution, rationale is also jus-
tified because legal institutions as well as the government itself have
been participants in the discrimination and the subordination of
blacks and women.247
Supporters also claim that affirmative action is necessary to
remedy the current effects of past discrimination and to create role
models or mentors within disadvantaged groups to show youth that
overcoming disadvantages and adversity is possible.248 However, in
Wygant, the Court explicitly held that curing societal discrimination
and providing role models for minorities are not sufficiently compel-
ling justifications to pass the strict scrutiny standard of review.249
Next, supporters justify affirmative action by stating that affirma-
tive action programs are needed in colleges and universities to correct
the inherent bias in admission programs that rely heavily upon stan-
dardized test, which work against minorities.250 As Professor Charles
Lawrence asserted, these standardized test scores “[do] a better job
predicting the socio-economic status of the test taker’s parents than
predicting college performance.” 251 Professor Schuck criticizes the core
of this argument as the redefining of merit to include other compo-
nents, which are not considered such as wisdom, originality, humor,
empathy, common sense, or independence, to name a few, instead of
the standard scholastic merit.252
Finally, affirmative action supporters find solace in Justice
Powell’s support of affirmative action programs to promote classroom
diversity in higher education. Justice Powell stated, “[t]he atmosphere
of speculation, experiment and creation—so essential to the quality
of higher education—is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse
student body.” 253 Justice Powell went on to state, “a diverse student
245. Schuck, supra note 4, at 28.
246. Id. at 22
247. Id. at 23.
248. Id. at 28–32 (citing WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, SHAPE OF THE RIVER: THE
LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY AD-
MISSIONS (1998)).
249. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
250. Lawrence, supra note 73, at 945.
251. Id.
252. Schuck, supra note 4, at 24–25.
253. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
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body . . . clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution
of higher education.” 254 Supporters of affirmative action have clung to
the “diversity rationale” in supporting affirmative action programs
in higher educations. As Michael Selmi states, “diversity has quite
clearly become the most heralded of all justifications for affirmative
action.” 255 Furthermore, there is the potential for increased accep-
tance of affirmative action under the “diversity rationale” as Professor
Schuck stated, because “depending on how diversity is defined, pref-
erences for middle-class minorities might fall within the rationale,
possibly facilitating public acceptance of the policy.” 256
B. Critics of Affirmative Action
Affirmative action programs have several critics that point out
the flaws in the justifications for affirmative action programs. First,
critics point out what they believe to be flawed reasoning in using af-
firmative action programs to remedy the past discrimination because
current generations are not the victims of past wrongs.257 Some of
these opponents to affirmative action assert that “affirmative action
programs cannot rectify past wrongs because their beneficiaries are
not the victims . . . preferences can only commit new wrongs because
the cost-bearers are innocent.” 258 However, this argument is also
flawed considering that members of the present generation are the
victims of past discrimination that has been perpetuated in society.
Moreover, opponents assert that American history is full of examples
of wrongdoing; “[w]ere we to take the project of restitution seriously,
we could not stop with slavery. . . .” 259 The opponents also assert that
“the restitution rationale could at most justify affirmative action for
the descendants of American slaves and perhaps Native Americans.”260
Next, critics attack affirmative action programs as a way of de-
feating the lack of expanding the term of “merit” in college and univer-
sity admissions.261 First, some believe that “[u]niversities . . . are in
the best position to define and measure merit in whatever terms they
254. Id. at 311–12.
255. Michael Selmi, The Facts of Affirmative Action, 85 VA. L. REV. 697, 729 (1999).
256. Schuck, supra note 4, at 35–36.
257. Id. at 23.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 23–24. (“[Restitution] could never justify extending protection to immigrants,
linguistic minorities like Hispanics, or geographic origin groups like Asians and Pacific
Islanders. Yet tens of millions of immigrants become automatically eligible for prefer-
ences the moment they set foot in the United States, competing for preferences with
blacks whose families have been in America since ante-bellum times.”).
261. Id. at 26.
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deem most relevant to their own institutions because they must bear
most if not all of any efficiency losses and other costs arising from any
errors in definition or measurement.” 262 Moreover, many opponents
agree with Justice Thomas, when he stated that under affirmative
action programs:
When blacks take positions in the highest places of government, in-
dustry, or academia, it is an open question today whether their
skin color played a part in their advancement. The question itself
is the stigma—because either racial discrimination did play a role,
in which case the person may be deemed “otherwise unqualified,”
or it did not, in which case asking the question itself unfairly
marks those blacks who would succeed without discrimination.263
Justice Thomas believed that affirmative action programs “stamp
minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop
dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are ‘entitled’ to prefer-
ences.” 264 Critics have pounced on these words to argue that affirma-
tive action programs create a stigma on their beneficiaries and a sense
of entitlement that actually works to cripple them.265
Furthermore, the “diversity rationale” as a justification for af-
firmative action is also problematic. In particular, critics point to the
fact that diversity does not have a clear meaning and, contrary to
what supporters of affirmative action claim, diversity is not just racial
diversity.266 Affirmative action programs in colleges and universities
do not consider the idea that “other attributes are also predictive of
one’s experiences, outlooks, and ideas.” 267 Religion, political affilia-
tion, and socio-economic status also influence perspectives.268 Critics
also point to the fact that it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine
when diversity has been met. Most colleges and universities’ admin-
istrators come up with an acceptable number by “simply count[ing]
the number of group members in the relevant community (or their per-
centage of the community total) and demand proportional represen-
tation, at least as a default but often, in effect, as the final answer.”269
Additionally, some critics ask, “how [do] favored groups in fact
confer diversity-value on a community” and “what diversity value does
a favored group actually confer?” 270 Opponents of affirmative action
262. Schuck, supra note 4, at 26.
263. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003).
264. Id.
265. Schuck, supra note 4, at 27–28.
266. See id. at 37–39.
267. Id. at 38.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 39.
270. Id. at 40–41.
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programs argue that a group can only create diversity value if the
group possesses certain desired qualities and if those qualities are
inherent in all members of the group, although, generally, no one “is
so stupid as to believe that all (or even most) members of any given
group necessarily have similar opinions on a variety of important
issues.” 271 Professor Schuck asserts that proponents of affirmative ac-
tion in colleges and universities assume “that black students bring
to campus histories and viewpoints that are unique to and universal
among black students even though those histories and viewpoints
are not racially or genetically hard-wired into them.” 272 The diversity
rationale can be said to treat African Americans as a monolithic col-
lection of individuals with the same beliefs and ideas. Whether affir-
mative action is justified and whether there is actually a “diversity
rationale” is still the subject of much debate.
C. Public Opinion on Affirmative Action
Affirmative Action still lives on despite mounting disapproval
over the last five decades. The public opinion on affirmative action
shows a steady decline with various nuances.273 In the 1960s, when
President Kennedy, and later, President Johnson, first began using
affirmative action programs, very little opposition existed, except
mostly by southern Democrats who wanted to prevent racial
quotas.274 In the 1980s, while there was indication that support of
affirmative action was down, there was “strong support for civil rights
and for special recruitment and training programs for minorities.” 275
The 1990s were also filled with both support and opposition among
the American public.
In 2003, a poll conducted by the Pew Research Centers showed
that Americans were conflicted, as the Supreme Court prepared to is-
sue another ruling on race-conscious admission policies in the wake of
the many uncertainties the Bakke case left unresolved.276 In that
2003 poll, conducted April 30–May 4 among 1,201 adults nationwide,
sixty-three said they favored “affirmative action programs designed
271. Schuck, supra note 4, at 42 (citing Sandford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. CONST.
L. 573, 577 (2000).
272. Id.
273. See, e.g., Euel Elliott & Andrew I.E. Ewoh, The Evolution of an Issue: The Rise and
Decline of Affirmative Action, 17 POL’Y STUD. REV. 212, 221, 225, 230 (2000).
274. Id. at 214–15 (quoting DONALD ALTSCHILLER, INTRODUCTION OF AFFIRMATIVE AC-
TION 8 (Donald Altschiller ed., 1991)).
275. Schuck, supra note 4, at 50–51.
276. Conflicted Views of Affirmative Action: Summary of Findings, PEW RESEARCH CEN-
TER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS (May 14, 2003), available at http://www.people-press
.org/2003/05/14/conflicted-views-of-affirmative-action/, archived at http://perma.cc/PDL9
-8ESE (discussing results of poll before Supreme Court’s ruling in Grutter and Gratz).
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to help blacks, women, and other minorities get better jobs and educa-
tion.” 277 The poll also revealed, however, that the devil was in the de-
tails. As the poll reported, there was “less support (57%) when the
question specifically mention[ed] giving ‘special preference’ to women
and minorities.” 278 The poll also found that the idea of affirmative
action as racial preferences mattered more for white Americans than
for nonwhite Americans.279 Particularly concerning college admissions,
sixty percent thought that affirmative action in college admissions
was a good idea; however, less than a majority (forty-seven percent)
said that the programs were fair.280 More importantly, only sixteen
percent of the public reported being directly affected by affirmative
action programs.281
Two years later in 2005, the Gallup Annual Minority Rights and
Relations Poll showed that the American public was deeply divided on
the issue of affirmative action. The poll found that fifty percent of
Americans favored affirmative action programs for racial minorities,
while forty-two percent were opposed.282 The decrease in support was
believed to have stemmed from the fact that fifty-nine percent of white
Americans believed that African Americans in America have equal job
opportunities with white Americans; however, only twenty-three per-
cent of African Americans agreed with this belief.283 The poll went on
to acknowledge that support for affirmative action varies depending
on how the question is worded.284
Four years later in 2009, in the wake of Justice Sonia Sotomayer’s
ruling in the Ricci case,285 a Quinnipiac University Poll found that
a majority (55%) of Americans believed that affirmative action should
be abolished.286 One noteworthy portion of the poll indicated that
“more than 70% of voters say diversity is not a good enough reason
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. (showing 86% of nonwhites favored affirmative action in general, and 82%
favored racial preferences; among whites, 58% supported the general concept, but only
49% supported preferences for minorities).
280. Id.
281. Id. (indicating that, overall, 11% of respondents reported they’ve been hurt and 4%
reported they have been helped. Also, among blacks, 14% reported that they have been
helped, while 5% reported they’ve been hurt. Among other non-whites, 11% reported being
helped and 13% reported being hurt).
282. Jeffrey M. Jones, Race, Ideology, and Support for Affirmative Action: Personal
Politics Has Little to do with Blacks’ Support, GALLUP (Aug. 23, 2005), available at http://




285. Ricci v. Destefano, 530 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2008).
286. Brown, supra note 18.
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to give minorities preferential treatment.” 287 Peter A. Brown, the
polling institute’s assistant director, said, “[t]he American public
seems to have gotten to the point where it believes the statute of
limitation has run out on the wrongs that led to affirmative action,
and it wants these programs ended.” 288
Most notable was the poll’s results concerning affirmative action
for gays and lesbians. When asked, “[i]n order to increase diversity, do
you support or oppose affirmative action programs that give prefer-
ences to gays and lesbians in hiring, promotion and college admis-
sions,” an overwhelming sixty-five percent of American voters opposed
the extension of affirmative action to aid gays and lesbians.289 This
percentage was consistent among all gender, political, racial, and reli-
gious groups, other than African Americans, who supported this prop-
osition by fifty-four percent.290
Currently, polls show a narrow margin of Americans support
abolishing affirmative action, while other polls show that a very nar-
row majority of Americans support some form of affirmative action.291
Some commentators attribute this change to a 2011 report by Pro-
fessor Michael Norton and Samuel Sommers indicating that white
Americans have come to see anti-white bias as a bigger societal prob-
lem than anti-black bias.292 Generally speaking, polls should have
little sway on the Supreme Court. However, when support for affirma-
tive action was at its highest, the Court decided Bakke.293 Once again
in 2003, when support for affirmative action was high, the Court
decided Grutter.294 As the support for affirmative action declined in
2009 and beyond, the Court seemed readily prepared to place defi-
nite limits on the use of racial preferences.295 Chief Justice Roberts
even stated, “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is
to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” 296 This shows that some
members the Supreme Court are poised to end all race-conscious
preferences of any type.
287. Id.
288. Peter Schmidt, Poll Finds Most Americans Oppose Affirmative Action when De-
fined as “Preferences”, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (June 3, 2009), available at http://
chronicle.com/article/Poll-Finds-Most-Americans/47684/, archived at http://perma.cc/ZW9R
-XFJP.
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Feb. 22, 2012, at A1.
292. Norton & Sommers, supra note 11, at 215.
293. Regents of Univ. of Cali. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265 (1979).
294. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 306 (2003).
295. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
296. Id. at 748.
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III. LGBT CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA
A. The Evolution of LGBT Civil Rights
As gay men and lesbians continue to struggle for equality in
America, with so many accomplishments in recent years, it is hard to
remember a time when homosexuals were not visible. It was not very
long ago that homosexual behavior was criminalized and men and
women who identified themselves as homosexuals were stripped of
their rights, in most instances by the courts and society.297 While the
origins of discrimination against homosexuals may go back as far as
the 1800s (and possibly beyond), for the purpose of this note I begin in
the 1990s.298 It is important to note that before World War I there
were several gay advocates and, what some term, the “homosexual
underground” subculture, but with the end of the war, many of these
individuals were censored and forced into invisibility because of
“hostility towards ‘difference.’ ” 299
The beginning of the 1990s opened with a rough start for the
LGBT civil rights movement. After the Bowers v. Hardwick decision
in 1986,300 the stigma associated with being labeled homosexual re-
mained and some states still had sodomy laws that criminalized
homosexual activity.301 Also, in 1992, Colorado took its opposition to
homosexuals one step further when it became the first state to abolish
civil rights protection for homosexuals by amending its constitution.302
Amendment 2 sought to prevent Colorado (and any city or town within
the state) from recognizing gays and lesbians as a protected class.303
However, this amendment would later be found to be unconstitutional
in 1996, by the Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans.304 But there were
more struggles for the LGBT community. In 1993, President Clinton
signed into law a ban on homosexual activity in the military called
297. Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1551, 1556, 1564, 1575, 1587–89, 1595–96, 1631 (1993).
298. Id. at 1554.
299. Id. at 1554–58.
300. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1996).
301. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A–6–60(2) (1975), 13A–6–65(a)(3) (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 800.02 (West 1993); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6605 (West 1972) (imposing a prison term of
not less than five years); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (1975) (imposing a prison term of not
more than five years); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (West 1942) (imposing a prison term of
not more than ten years); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-177 (West 1994); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-15-120 (1962) (imposing a five-year prison term); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403(1)
(West 1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361(A) (1993).
302. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 637 (1996).
303. Id.
304. Id.
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“Don’t Ask Don’t Tell,” which operated to dishonorably discharge
openly gay and lesbian soldiers (if they were caught).305 Some consider
Don’t Ask Don’t Tell to be “the most detrimental federal program per-
taining to homosexual rights.” 306 Don’t Ask Don’t Tell condoned the
continued stigma associated with being homosexual by making it
incompatible with “high standards of morale, good order and disci-
pline . . . .” 307 This all culminated in a crushing blow called the Defense
of Marriage Act (DOMA), which codified the federal definition of
marriage as “a legal union between one man and one woman.” 308
This set the stage for many states to ban same-sex marriage.
Toward the end of the 1990s, the tide began to change in favor of
LGBT civil rights. More states began to repeal their anti-sodomy
laws.309 In 1996 in Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court ruled that
Colorado’s Amendment 2, which placed a ban on recognizing gays and
lesbians as a protected class, was unconstitutional.310 Also, “[b]y 1999,
over half of the Fortune 500 companies included sexual orientation
in their workplace anti-discrimination policies, and anti-discrimina-
tion policies in universities had become virtually standard.” 311 One
of the most significant events of 1999 was when the Supreme Court
of Vermont held that the state had to offer the benefits and respon-
sibilities of civil marriage to same sex couples in Baker v. State.312
This provided a stepping stone for the events of the early 2000s.
The 2000s were filled with even more advances. According to a
poll taken in 2003, fifty-four percent of American believed that ho-
mosexuality was an acceptable alternative lifestyle,313 compared to
thirty-four percent in 1982.314 Sixty percent of Americans felt that
homosexual relations between consenting adults should be legal,
305. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993).
306. Phong Duong, Comment, A Survey of Gay Rights Culminating in Lawrence v.
Texas, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 539, 553 (2003–2004).
307. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1989).
308. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
309. Duong, supra note 306, at 554–55 (“[B]y 2001 only nine states (Alabama, Florida,
Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina Utah, and Virginia) pro-
hibited both same and opposite-sex sodomy.”).
310. Romer, 517 U.S. at 637.
311. Sharon E. Debbage Alexander, Romer v. Evans and the Amendment 2 Controversy:
The Rhetoric and Reality of Sexual Orientation Discrimination in America, 6 TEX. F. ON
C.L. & C.R. 261, 271 (2002).
312. 744 A.2d 864, 888–89 (Vt. 1999).
313. Frank Newport, Six out of 10 Americans Say Homosexual Relations Should be Rec-
ognized as Legal, GALLUP (May 15, 2003), http://www.gallup.com/poll/8413/six-americans
-say-homosexual-relations-should-recognized-legal.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/6Q2J
-5LTN.
314. Eric K.M. Yatar, Defamation, Privacy, and the Changing Social Status of Homo-
sexuality: Re-Thinking Supreme Court Gay Rights Jurisprudence, 12 L. & SEXUALITY
119, 135–36 (2003).
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compared to forty-three percent in 1977.315 Furthermore, eighty-eight
percent of Americans believed that homosexuals should have equal
rights when it comes to job opportunities, compared to fifty-eight
percent in 1977.316 Most importantly, on June 26, 2003, the Supreme
Court, in Lawrence v. Texas, overruled its previous holding in Bowers
and held that the fundamental right to privacy did extend to con-
sensual homosexual conduct between adults.317 The Lawrence deci-
sion effectively put an end to sodomy laws in America.
By 2003, several states had laws that protected gays and lesbi-
ans from discrimination in employment.318 Also, several states in-
cluded sexual orientation as a factor in laws criminalizing hate
crimes.319 Additionally, some states extended health insurance and
financial benefits to same-sex partners of their employees.320 In 2003,
the Massachusetts Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage in
Massachusetts.321
Over the remaining years from the 2000s until present day, the
LGBT civil rights movement continued to make incredible steps
toward equality for homosexuals in America. First, according to the
Human Rights Campaign, thirty-six states and Washington, D.C. now
provide some kind of recognition to the relationships of same-sex
couples.322 In, addition, nine states and Washington, D.C. provide
civil unions or domestic partnerships.323 Furthermore, 21 states plus
Washington, D.C. prohibit discrimination against an individual based
upon his or her sexual orientation in employment decisions,324 and
21 states prohibit discrimination in housing based on an individual’s
sexual orientation.325
More Americans began to approve of same-sex relationships and
show support for same-sex marriage. In a poll conducted in May 2011,
315. Newport, supra note 313.
316. Id.
317. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
318. Developments in the Law—The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1996, 2014–15 (2003).
319. Id. at 2015.
320. Yatar, supra note 314, at 138–39.
321. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
322. Maps of State Laws & Policies: Marriage Equality and Other Relationship Recog-
nition Laws, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.hrc.org/state_maps,
archived at http://perma.cc/K2BP-27AP.
323. Id.
324. Maps of State Laws & Policies: Statewide Employment Laws and Policies, HUMAN
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.hrc.org/state_maps, archived at http://perma
.cc/K2BP-27AP.
325. Maps of State Laws & Policies: Statewide Housing Laws and Policies, HUMAN
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.hrc.org/state_maps, archived at http://
perma.cc/K2BP-27AP.
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fifty-six percent of Americans approved of gay and lesbian relations.326
Additionally, in an unprecedented and historical event, on May 9,
2012, President Barack Obama became the first president to publicly
support legalization of same-sex marriage.327 In a Gallup poll taken
the day after President Obama’s historic announcement, a majority
of Americans reported that same-sex relations should be legal.328 The
poll showed that sixty-three of Americans support legalizing same-
sex marriage and that “women, adults aged (sic) 18 to 34, and Demo-
crats are more supportive of gay rights than their counterparts.” 329
However, thirty states and the District of Columbia have amended
their constitutions to prevent same-sex marriage by defining marriage
as between a man and a woman, although these provisions have been
struck down in all but 13 states and the District of Columbia.330
On October 28, 2009, President Obama signed the Matthew
Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act into law,331
and currently, thirty states and Washington, D.C. have laws that per-
tain to crimes involving bias against a person based on sexual orien-
tation.332 On December 22, 2010, President Obama signed the repeal
of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” putting an end to the military’s ban on ho-
mosexuals serving in the military.” 333 Furthermore, on February 23,
2011, the Obama Administration decided to stop defending the
326. Lydia Saad, Doctor-Assisted Suicide Is Moral Issue Dividing Americans Most:
Pornography, Gay Relations Produce Biggest Generational Gaps, GALLUP (May 31, 2011),
available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/147842/doctor-assisted-suicide-moral-issue-divid
ing-americans.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/SVL6-Z4B7.
327. Adam Nagourney, A Watershed Move, Both Risky and Inevitable, N.Y. TIMES,
May 9, 2012, at A1.
328. Lydia Saad, U.S. Acceptance of Gay/Lesbian Relations is the New Normal: For
Third Year, Majority Says Gay/Lesbian Relations are Morally Acceptable, GALLUP (May 14,
2012), available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/154634/acceptance-gay-lesbian-relations
-new-normal.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/9XX4-XF4S.
329. Id.
330. Maps of State Laws & Policies, Statewide Marriage Prohibition Laws, HUMAN
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/state_maps (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived
at http://perma.cc/K2BP-27AP. But see Sarah Warbelow, What Today’s Supreme Court
Denial of Cert for Marriage Equality Means for You and Your Family, HUMAN RIGHTS
CAMPAIGN (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/what-todays-supreme-court-denial
-of-cert-for-marriage-equality-cases-means, archived at http://perma.cc/XD8H-4MLQ (ex-
plaining that the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari on marriage equality cases meant
that the rulings striking down bans on same-sex marriage in Utah, Oklahoma, Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Indiana would stand, and that the bans on same-sex marriage in West Vir-
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Kansas, Colorado, and Wyoming would also be
struck down as a direct result).
331. Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 249.
332. Maps of State Laws and Policies, State Hate Crimes Laws, HUMAN RIGHTS CAM-
PAIGN (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), http://www.hrc.org/state_maps, archived at http://
perma.cc/K2BP-27AP.
333. Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2012, 10 U.S.C. § 37.
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constitutionality of DOMA stating that classifications based on sex-
ual orientation should be subjected to heightened scrutiny.334 This
set the stage for one of the biggest victories in the LGBT civil rights
moment—United States v. Windsor.335
B. Windsor v. United States: The Demise of DOMA
Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer began a long-term relationship in
1963.336 Concerned about Spyer’s health, in 2007 the couple made a
trip to Canada for their marriage.337 The state of New York deemed
their marriage valid.338 When Spyer died in 2009, she left her entire
estate to Windsor.339 Windsor was required to pay $363,053 in estate
taxes because she did not qualify for the surviving spouse exemption
from federal estate tax as a result of DOMA’s definition of spouse.340
Section 3 of DOMA defined marriage for the purpose of any federal
law as “only a legal union between one man and one woman as hus-
band and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.” 341 On November 9, 2010,
Ms. Edith Windsor brought suit to declare that Section 3 of DOMA
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.342
While the suit was still pending, the President directed the De-
partment of Justice to stop defending the constitutionality of DOMA’s
section 3 definition.343 The Attorney General informed Congress that
“the President has concluded that given a number of factors, includ-
ing a documented history of discrimination, classifications based on
sexual orientation should be subject to a heightened standard of
scrutiny.”344 In response the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG)
of the House of Representatives intervened in the litigation to de-
fend section 3 of DOMA.345
1. The District Court’s Ruling
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York ruled in favor of the plaintiff, Edith Windsor, finding that
334. Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Shift, U.S. Says Marriage Act Blocks
Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, February 24, 2011, at A1.
335. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).




340. Id. at 2683.
341. Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996).
342. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 2684.
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DOMA’s section 3 violated Windsor’s right to equal protection under
the Fifth Amendment.346 While Windsor argued that DOMA should
be subjected to heightened scrutiny (either strict or intermediate scru-
tiny), the court indicated that courts should be reluctant to establish
new suspect classes.347 However, the court held that it was unneces-
sary to determine if sexual orientation was a suspect classification be-
cause DOMA “may be disposed of under a rational basis review.” 348
Instead, the court held, “the rational basis analysis can vary by con-
text,” and “ ‘law[s that] exhibit[ ] . . . a desire to harm a politically un-
popular group’ [ ] receive ‘a more searching form of rational basis
review . . . .’ ” 349
The court went on to apply rational basis to determine if BLAG
had a legitimate state interest and whether DOMA was rationally
related to those legitimate state interests.350 Finding that each of
BLAG legitimate state interests were indeed legitimate state inter-
ests, the court held that DOMA was not rationally related to any of
those legitimate state interests.351 For example, BLAG asserted that
DOMA was supported by the legitimate interest of “deter[ring] hetero-
sexual couples from having children out of wedlock” 352; however, the
court concluded that “Congress’s goal [was] so far removed from the
classification.” that it was not narrowly tailored353 The court held that
“DOMA [had] no direct impact of heterosexual couples at all; there-
fore, its ability to deter those couples from having children outside of
marriage, or to incentivize couples that are pregnant to get married,
is remote, at best.” 354 The court went on to grant summary judgment
in favor of Ms. Windsor.355
2. The Appeals Court’s Ruling
After the District Court’s Ruling, BLAG appealed the court’s de-
cision.356 Unlike the District Court, which seemed reluctant to find
that homosexuals were a suspect class, the Appeals Court decided
that no variation of rational basis was required because homosexuals
346. See Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
347. Id. at 401.
348. Id. at 402.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 403.
351. Id. at 402–06. BLAG asserted several legitimate state interests, including childrear-
ing and procreation, caution and maintaining the traditional institution of marriage, and
consistency and uniformity with regards to federal benefits.
352. Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 404.
353. Id. at 405.
354. Id. at 404.
355. Id. at 406.
356. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 169–70 (2d Cir. 2012).
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were a quasi-suspect class.357 After taking this unprecedented step,
the Second Circuit went on to explain why homosexuality should be
treated as a suspect classification. The court used the four factors
the Supreme Court generally uses to determine if there is justifica-
tion for heightened scrutiny.358 The court listed those factors as:
A) whether the class has been historically “subjected to discrimina-
tion; B) whether the class has a defining characteristic that “fre-
quently bears [a] relation to ability to perform or contribute to
society; C) whether the class exhibits “obvious, immutable, or dis-
tinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group;”
and D) whether the class is “a minority or politically powerless.” 359
The court concluded that the “all four factors justify heightened scru-
tiny” in this case.360 First, the court held that homosexuals were his-
torically subjected to discrimination as apparent in past actions that
made homosexuality criminal.361 Next, the court concluded that homo-
sexual did not bear a relation to ability to perform or contribute to
society.362 The court also concluded that “homosexuality is a suffi-
ciently discernible characteristic to define a discrete minority class.”363
The court’s conclusion was founded on the fact that the court found
that “[n]o ‘obvious badge’ is necessary” and certain classifications are
still discernible characteristics “even though these characteristics do
not declare themselves.” 364 Finally, by examining the parallels be-
tween the status of homosexuality and the status of women at the
time of the decision to apply heightened scrutiny to classification
based on gender, the court found that although “[homosexuals’] po-
sition ‘has improved markedly in recent decades’ . . . they still ‘face
pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination . . . in the
political arena.’ ” 365
After the court determined that homosexuals were a part of sus-
pect class subject to heightened scrutiny, the court concluded that
“the class is quasi-suspect . . . based on the weight of the factors and
on analogy to the classifications recognized as suspect and quasi-
suspect.” 366 This meant that the court reached the conclusion that
357. Id. at 181–82.
358. Id. at 181–85.
359. Id. at 181 (internal references omitted).
360. Id.
361. Id. at 182.
362. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 182–83.
363. Id. at 183.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 184 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685–86 (1973)).
366. Id. at 185.
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the classification in that case should be quasi-suspect by looking at the
parallels between race, national origin, gender, and illegitimacy.367
The court concluded that Section 3 of DOMA did not pass the
intermediate level of scrutiny, which requires that the classification
must be substantially related to an important (or exceedingly per-
suasive) government interest, making DOMA unconstitutional.368 The
court held that maintain a uniform definition of marriage was not an
exceedingly persuasive justification for DOMA because “DOMA is
an unprecedented breach of longstanding deference to federalism that
singles out same-sex marriage. . . .” 369 The court also held DOMA
was not substantially related to the exceeding persuasive justifica-
tion of “sav[ing] government resources by limiting the beneficiaries
of government marital benefits,” because DOMA was so broad that
it touched federal laws that were not related to fiscal matters.370 The
court held that preserving a traditional understanding of marriage
was not an exceedingly persuasive justification for DOMA “because
the decision of whether same-sex couples can marry is left to the
states.” 371 Finally, the court held that DOMA was not substantially
related to the important government interest of encouraging procre-
ation because “DOMA does not provide any incremental reason for
opposite-sex couples to engage in ‘responsible procreation.’ ” 372
3. The Supreme Court’s Decision
On December 7, 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States
granted a writ of certiorari to determine whether DOMA was consti-
tutional under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.373 In a 5–4
decision, the Court found that DOMA was unconstitutional “as a dep-
rivation of the liberty of the persons protected by the Fifth Amend-
ment.” 374 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy explained that
DOMA was in contradiction with general principles under the con-
stitution.375 Throughout the opinion, Justice Kennedy continuously
reiterated that New York granted dignity to same-sex marriages and
that DOMA essentially takes away the dignity of these marriages.376
367. Id.
368. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d at 185.
369. Id. at 186.
370. Id. at 187.
371. Id. at 187 (citing the District Court’s ruling at Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 403).
372. Id. at 188.
373. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d. 169, cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (Dec. 7, 2012).
374. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694–95.
375. See id.
376. See id. at 2692–94.
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Justice Kennedy began by explaining that throughout history and
by tradition, the authority to determine who is married within a state
has generally “been treated as being within the authority and realm
of the separate States.” 377 Justice Kennedy admitted that this tra-
dition and history was not without its exceptions. He noted that
Congress “can make determinations that bear on marital rights and
privileges.” 378 Justice Kennedy pointed out the flaw in DOMA was
it pervasiveness. He explained that when compared to the discrete ex-
amples where Congress regulated the meaning of marriage, “DOMA
has a far greater reach; for it enacts a directive applicable to over
1,000 federal statutes and the whole realm of federal regulations.” 379
Justice Kennedy also pointed out that DOMA created two sta-
tuses of married individuals within one state, by having one class of
married individuals who are married for federal purposes and another
class who are not.380 He explained that “DOMA rejects the long-es-
tablished precept that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of mar-
riage are uniform for all married couples within each State, though
they may vary, subject to constitutional guarantees, from one State
to the next.” 381 Even though DOMA defies state sovereignty, Justice
Kennedy noted that it was not necessary to determine whether DOMA
was unconstitutional under principles of federalism.382 He stated it
was “unnecessary to decide whether this federal intrusion on state
power is a violation of the Constitution because it disrupts the federal
balance. The State’s power in defining the marital relation is of central
relevance in this case quite apart from principles of federalism.” 383
Stressing the idea of equality, Justice Kennedy explained that
“DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York seeks to protect.” 384
New York sought to make same-sex marriages equal to opposite-sex
marriages in the state, but DOMA sought to once again make same-
sex marriage unequal. By doing this, Justice Kennedy stated that
“[DOMA] violates the basic due process and equal protection princi-
ples applicable to the Federal Government.” 385
Next, the Court applied an equal protection analysis, without say-
ing that it is applying an equal protection analysis. Justice Kennedy
starts with this principle: “[t]he Constitution’s guarantee of equality
‘must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm
377. Id. at 2689–90.
378. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690.
379. Id. at 2690.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 2692.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 2693.
385. Id.
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a politically unpopular group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of
that group.” 386 Essentially, Justice Kenney applied the first prong
of any level of review—determining if the government had a suffi-
cient justification for the discrimination. The opinion dodged one of
the most important questions in this case: the appropriate level of re-
view for classes drawn based on homosexuality.387 The idea at its
most basic principle is this: determining the appropriate level of
review is not necessary, according to the majority, because a bare con-
gressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group never justi-
fies disparate treatment under any level of scrutiny.388
Justice Kennedy went on to hold that “determining whether a law
is motivated by an improper animus or purpose, “ ‘[d]iscriminations of
an unusual character” ’ especially require careful consideration.” 389
He went on to explain that because of “DOMA’s unusual deviation
from the usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions
of marriage . . . [there] is strong evidence of [the] law having the pur-
pose and effect of disapproval of that class.” 390 Justice Kennedy then
showed how DOMA indeed had the purpose and effect of disadvan-
taging of homosexuals.391 First, he looked at the history of the enact-
ment of DOMA.392 He explains that “[the] enactment and its own text
demonstrate that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex mar-
riages . . . . was its essence.” 393 He also notes that DOMA’s purpose
was “to ensure that if any State decides to recognize same-sex mar-
riages, those unions will be treated as second-class marriages for
purposes of federal law.” 394 Justice Kennedy also noted that DOMA
had the effect of displaying disapproval of homosexuals by “writ[ing]
inequality into the entire United States Code.” 395 He stated that
“[a]mong the over 1,000 statutes and numerous federal regulations
that DOMA controls are laws pertaining to Social Security, housing,
taxes, criminal sanctions, copyright, and veterans’ benefits.” 396
386. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (quoting Dep’t of Ag. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–
35(1973)).
387. Id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The opinion does not resolve and indeed does not
even mention what had been the central question in this litigation: whether, under the
Equal Protection Clause, laws restricting marriage to a man and woman are reviewed
for more than mere rationality.”).
388. Id.
389. Id. at. 2693 (majority opinion).
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
393. Id. (quoting the conclusion reached in the House: “ ‘[b]oth moral disapproval of ho-
mosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with tradi-
tional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality.’ ”)).
394. Id. at 2693–64.
395. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
396. Id.
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In closing, Justice Kennedy stated that “[t]he federal statute is
invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to
disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws,
sought to protect in personhood and dignity.” 397 Even if the state had
a legitimate purpose, it would not be sufficient to overcome the state’s
constitutional decision to grant protection to certain marriages within
that state.398
In a dissent written by Justice Scalia (in which Justice Thomas
joined), Justice Scalia seemed very perplexed by the majority’s opin-
ion.399 Justice Scalia called the opinion’s justifications “rootless and
shifting.” 400 He seemed to take offense to the fact that the opinion be-
gan with a reiteration of the states’ power to define marriage, but
noted that the majority opinion was not a federalism opinion.401 Jus-
tice Scalia also noted that the opinion echoed analyses of equal pro-
tection, as the opinion makes several citations to equal protection
cases, but the Court does not determine the appropriate level of re-
view.402 He signaled that rational basis review was the appropriate
level of review for DOMA, and under traditional rational basis review
there were “justifying rationales for [the] legislation.” 403 Justice Scalia
went on to explain how this decision will be used in the future to find
state laws denying same-sex marriage unconstitutional as motivated
by “ ‘bare . . . desire to harm’ couples in same-sex marriages.” 404
The Windsor decision was one of the most important victories
in the LGBT civil rights movement.405 After the decision, President
Obama said that he had “directed the Attorney General to work with
other members of [his] Cabinet to review all relevant federal statutes
to ensure this decision, including its implications for Federal benefits
and obligations, is implemented swiftly and smoothly.” 406 In the up-
coming months, many legally married couples will be allowed for the
first time to take advantage of over 1,000 federal benefits that were
previously denied to them.407 However, some federal benefits will be
397. Id. at 2696.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 2697, 2705.
400. Id. at 2705.
401. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2705.
402. Id, at 2706–07.
403. Id. at 2707–08 (discussing justifications for DOMA such as avoiding difficult choice-
of-law issues, and guarding prior legislation against unforeseen changes in circumstance).
404. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709–11.
405. Liz Halloran, After DOMA: What’s Next for Gay Married Couples, NPR (June 26,
2013, 11:52 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/06/26/195881288/after-doma
-whats-next-for-gay-married-couples, archived at http://perma.cc/3ECN-S372.
406. Id.
407. Eyder Peralta, Court Overturns DOMA, Sidesteps Broad Gay Marriage Ruling,
NPR (June 26, 2013, 10:04 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/06/26/19585
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limited to only those persons living in states that recognize same-
sex marriage because some federal laws use state law to determine
marital status.408
C. Hollingsworth v. Perry: The Fall of Proposition 8
On the same day the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Wind-
sor, it issued its ruling in Hollingsworth v. Perry,409 which was another
(although limited) victory for LGBT individuals living in California.
The Hollingsworth case was created in the aftermath of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court’s 2008 holding that limiting marriage to opposite-
sex couples violated the California Constitution.410 After this holding,
California voters passed Proposition 8 (“Prop 8”), which amended the
California Constitution to define marriage as a union between a man
and a woman.411 Suit was filed in federal court challenging Prop 8 as
an unconstitutional violation of the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.412 The named defendants
(the Governor, Attorney General, and other officials) refused to defend
Prop 8, and the Court allowed proponents of it to intervene to defend
it.413 The District Court declared the amendment unconstitutional.414
The officials elected not to appeal; however, the intervening propo-
nents did.415 Relying on the California Supreme Court’s ruling that
the proponents had standing to appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed
that the proponents had standing to appeal.416 The Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that Prop 8 was unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause because it had no legitimate purpose “but to impose
on gays and lesbians . . . a majority’s private disapproval of them and
their relationships.” 417 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
directed that the parties also brief and argue “[w]hether [t]he peti-
tioners have standing under Article III . . . .’ ” 418
On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court issued its holding that the
petitioners (the proponents of Prop 8) did not have standing under
7796/supreme-court-strikes-down-defense-of-marriage-act, archived at http://perma.cc
/ZA8Q-UQF3.
408. Halloran, supra note 405.
409. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
410. See In Re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (2008).
411. CAL. CONST., art. I, § 7.5 (stating that “[o]nly marriage[s] between a man and a
woman is (sic) valid or recognized in California”).
412. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
416. Id.
417. Id. at 1095.
418. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2661.
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Article III of the Constitution.419 In the 5–4 opinion written by Chief
Justice Roberts, the Court concentrated on the fact that the propo-
nents of Prop 8 did not have “an injury that affect[ed] [them] in a
‘personal and individual way.’ ” 420 The Court also indicated that the
proponents of Prop 8 did not have a “ ‘direct stake’ in the outcome of
their appeal [because] their only interest . . . was to vindicate the con-
stitutional validity of a generally applicable California law.” 421 The
Court went on to explain why the proponents could not assert the
interest of the state of California in appealing the District Court’s
ruling.422 The Court explained that even though there were excep-
tions to the prohibition against third party standing, “when [the Court
has] allowed litigants to assert the interests of others, the litigants
themselves still ‘must have suffered an injury in fact, thus giving
[them] a sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of the issue in
dispute.’ ” 423 The Court held that the judgment of the Ninth Circuit
should be vacated and remanded with instructions that the appeal
from the District Court should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.424
It seems unbelievable that the LGBT civil rights movement was
able to gain steam and accomplish so much over the past three de-
cades. Just between the 1990s and 2013, Americans’ perception of
gays and lesbians changed drastically.425 In fact, some have claimed
that there is no longer a need for laws that protect gays or lesbians be-
cause they are now on an equal playing field, because the LGBT civil
rights movement “[has] gained more political ground in less time than
just about any other interest group in American political history.” 426
Considering this, as some colleges and universities have begun re-
questing information concerning an applicant’s sexual orientation,
the question remains whether students who choose to come out in the
admissions process should be given affirmative action treatment.
IV. ANALYZING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS THAT BENEFIT
LGBT INDIVIDUALS IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS
A. Origins of Support for Affirmative Action for LGBT Individuals
The beginning point of an analysis to determine whether affir-
mative action treatment is appropriate for LGBT individuals during
419. See id. at 2668.
420. Id. at 2662.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 2663–64.
423. Id. at 2663.
424. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668.
425. See Barnes, supra note 15.
426. Id. (quoting a legal brief filed on behalf of the House of Representatives in support
of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)).
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the college or university admissions process requires a brief discus-
sion of the roots of the argument. Most of the justification for LGBT
equal rights comes from an analogy to the civil rights movements of
racial minorities, women, and disabled individuals.427 This analogy
is deeply rooted in past discrimination.428
The analogy between the LGBT equal rights movement and other
civil rights movements (like those of African Americans and women)
finds its foundation upon the differential and discriminatory treat-
ment of LGBT individuals throughout American history.429 First, as
mentioned above, homosexuality has been thought to be morally
wrong throughout American history and has resulted in death and,
until the 1990s and 2000s, criminalization.430 The harsh laws against
homosexuals force them to hide their true identities in an effort to
avoid discrimination and persecution.431 Additionally, support for
discriminatory behaviors against gays and lesbians was based on
traditional morals based on language in the Bible, and these justifi-
cations were used to continue discrimination against LGBT individ-
uals, contributed to the stigma associated with being homosexual,
and created homophobia.432 These biblical arguments were the same
as those used to justify discrimination against African Americans
and women.433 Many proponents of this “sameness” argument find
support in comparing homophobia to racism.434 This controversial
belief is founded in the fact that African Americans (as well as women
and the disabled) and homosexuals have been the victims of invidi-
ous treatment at the hands of a majority, whether that majority is
white, male, and/or heterosexual.435
Next, proponents of this “sameness” argument use comparisons
between same-sex marriage bans and miscegenation laws (laws that
prevent a black person from marrying a white person), which were
struck down in Loving v. Virginia.436 These proponents find support in
the fact that the arguments used against the unconstitutionality of
427. See Margaret M. Russell, Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Rights and “The Civil Rights
Agenda,” 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 33 (1994).
428. Id.
429. Id. at 35–37.
430. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
431. Byrne, supra note 13, at 54.
432. Russell, supra note 427, at 43–44.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 37–39 (discussing the animosity that results when homophobia is considered
as “comparable” to racism).
435. Id. at 44.
436. Herbert C. Brown, Jr., History Doesn’t Repeat Itself, but It Does Rhyme—Same-
Sex Marriage: Is the African-American Community the Oppressor this Time?, 34 S.U. L.
REV. 169, 194–96 (2007) (hereinafter History Doesn’t Repeat Itself) (citing Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) and discussing similarities between support for miscegenation
laws and oppression to same-sex marriage).
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miscegenation laws are the same constitutional arguments used to
support opposition to same-sex marriage.437 Opponents of same-sex
marriage claim that marriage should be left to the providence of the
states rather than the federal government.438 Opponents also claim
that same-sex marriages are immoral and not within the traditional
concept of marriage,439 just as they once argued that marriage between
a white person and a black person was not moral, natural, or within
the traditional notion of marriage.440
Although there are similarities between the LGBT civil rights
movement and the African-American civil rights movement, these
similarities have their flaws. One point of opposition to the “same-
ness” argument is that sexual orientation, unlike race, is not an
immutable trait.441 For example, supporters of Colorado’s Amend-
ment 2 reacted to the “sameness” argument by arguing that homo-
sexuality is not an immutable trait (like race or gender), but instead
it is a behavior that one chooses to engage in and “that declaring one’s
minority sexual orientation, unlike acknowledging one’s minority
race, was a conscious choice to behave in a stigmatized manner (after
all, one ‘couldn’t do anything about’ being African-American or
Latino).” 442 Others oppose the “sameness” argument by the degree
of discrimination. Some have stated that gay and lesbian experiences
are not comparable to the experiences of African Americans because
gays and lesbians “were [not] enslaved for 300 years and were con-
tinued in the segregated society for another 150 years.” 443 Further,
General Colin L. Powell stated, while defending the military’s ban
on gays, “ ‘[h]omosexuality is not a benign . . . characteristic, such as
skin color or whether you’re Hispanic or Oriental. . . . It goes to one
of the most fundamental aspects of human behavior.’ ” 444
Even though the parallels between LGBT civil rights and African-
American civil rights (and others) seem to still be highly debated,
the LGBT community has suffered past discrimination appropriately
supported by the well-documented fact that gays and lesbians have
been discriminated against throughout history and, to some degree,
continue to be discriminated against today.445 However, the analysis
of whether affirmative action programs are appropriate in college
437. Id. at 193–96.
438. Id. at 193–94 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)).
439. See Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
440. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1967).
441. Russell, supra note 427, at 45.
442. Id.
443. History Doesn’t Repeat Itself, supra note 436, at 197–98 (quoting Bishop George
McKinney of St. Stephen’s Church of God in Christ).
444. Russell, supra note 427, at 37–38 (quoting General Colin L. Powell).
445. Byrne, supra note 13, at 52–53.
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admission for self-identified LGBT applicants does not end with a
comparison of past discrimination. Furthermore, the degree of past
discrimination is not relevant; whether this discrimination came by
enslavement or by forced invisibility is mere pretext and of no con-
sequence. Affirmative action programs only seek to remedy the
effects of past discrimination, no matter the degree of that discrimi-
nation.446 Therefore, a comparison to other beneficiaries of affirma-
tive action treatment, while helpful, is neither decisive nor necessary.
Further analysis of the appropriateness of affirmative action treat-
ment for LGBT applicants in college admissions depends on whether
the extension would be supported by traditional justifications for
affirmative action programs.
B. Analysis in Context of Three Traditional Justifications for
Affirmative Action
To determine if the extension of affirmative action treatment to
self-identified LGBT applicants in college admissions policies is ap-
propriate, the history and current situation of LGBT individuals in
America must be examined in the context of the three traditional justi-
fications for affirmative action: remedying the effects of past dis-
crimination, role modeling, and diversity.447
1. Remedial Purpose Justification
First, affirmative action programs find their strongest justifica-
tion in the need to remedy the effect of past discrimination.448 In City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. the Supreme Court showed that justi-
fication for affirmative action has deep origins in the need to remedy
past discrimination.449 However, upon further review, we find a need
to overcome the present effects of past discrimination, which requires
that there be a current problem or consequences associated with that
past discrimination.450 Indeed, the need for a present problem that
stems from past discrimination is supported by the Court’s decision in
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.451 There the Court struggled to
find statistical support for the effects of past discrimination in order
to uphold a city set-aside program for minority businesses.452 In that
446. Id. at 68.
447. Id. at 68–70.
448. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280–81 (1986).
449. 488 U.S. 469, 477 (1989).
450. Id. at 508.
451. Id. at 507–10.
452. See id.
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case, the Court emphasized the need for proof that remedial measures
were needed and held that statistical disparities may be enough to
prove the continued effects of past discrimination.453 The remedial jus-
tification for affirmative action is a backwards looking notion that
seeks to erase past discrimination in hopes of creating a current en-
vironment that is free of the effects of that past discrimination.454
In the case of race, the current effects of the past discrimination
are racism that is still prevalent today and the shortage of minority
students enrolled in colleges and universities.455 Furthermore, col-
leges and universities seek to remedy the discrimination that they
themselves participated in against African Americans and other
minorities through affirmative action policies designed to increase
the percentage of minorities in colleges and universities.456 Colleges
and universities believe that these programs will help increase the
percentage of minorities to a level that is equivalent to what it would
have been (or at least what they perceived it would have been) with-
out the past discrimination.457
In the case of LGBT individuals, it is necessary to determine what
effects of past discrimination affirmative action programs would be
seeking to remedy. While homophobia and systematic discrimination
against homosexuals still exist, generally the need for affirmative
action programs is predicated upon statistical evidence of disparate
treatment in opportunities between two groups.458 In this case, statis-
tical evidence of a disparity between heterosexuals and homosexuals
in colleges and university admission would justify a need for affir-
mative action policies in college and university admissions for self-
identified LGBT individuals. However, there is no statistical evidence
that this disparity exists.459 Absent this statistical evidence, affirma-
tive action policies for self-identified LGBT individuals would need
to find support in one of the additional traditional justifications for
affirmative action policies.
Furthermore, the lack of statistical evidence gives credence to the
innocent victim rationale for opposition to the extension of affirma-
tive action for LGBT individuals. Without statistical evidence sup-
porting a present problem with the presence of LGBT students at
colleges and universities, heterosexual students are more likely to
be seen as innocent victims because the affirmative action policy
453. Id. at 501–02.
454. Schuck, supra note 4, at 22.
455. Lawrence, supra note 73, at 956–57.
456. See id.
457. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272 (1979).
458. See supra Part I.A.
459. See A Survey of LGBT Americans, supra note 3.
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would likely be seen as unnecessary given the lack of evidence.460 Fur-
thermore, given the fact that a large number of college age Ameri-
cans support the LGBT equal rights agenda, there is an increased
appearance that these Americans would be seen as innocent victims.461
While other victims of past discrimination, like African Ameri-
cans, found justification for affirmative action policies in college and
university admissions based on the restitution (or remedial purpose)
rationale, colleges and universities would be hard-pressed to find
support for affirmative action treatment for self-identified LGBT
students through the restitution rationale.462 The most distinguish-
ing feature of present consequence of the past discrimination for
racial minorities and women is that “[r]ace and gender discrimina-
tion create economic disadvantage, whereas sexual orientation dis-
crimination most often creates gay and lesbian invisibility.” 463 Yes,
homophobia and discrimination against homosexuals still does exist;
however, colleges and universities must prove that the effects of
both past and continued discrimination have affected their student
bodies in a way that has warranted an increase presence of LGBT
students.464 Generally, this proof comes by reliance on statistical evi-
dence; without which, there is no perceived need for affirmative
action treatment for these students.465 However, colleges and uni-
versities may have support in one of the remaining justifications for
affirmative action.
2. Role Modeling Justification
Another justification for traditional affirmative action policies
in college and university admissions is the role modeling justification.
This justification is built on the belief that there is a need for role
models in minority groups, “especially [among] the young who need
to have high aspirations and confidence that others have succeeded
despite their common legacy of group disadvantage.” 466 However,
the Supreme Court, in Wygant, held that the role modeling justifica-
tion is not sufficiently compelling to withstand a constitutional chal-
lenge.467 This justification still has importance because it can be used
460. Byrne, supra note 13, at 86 (noting a common, if perhaps unsupported, view that
white, heterosexuals suffer from affirmative action).
461. Id. at 86–87.
462. Id. at 74–75.
463. Id. at 74.
464. Id.
465. See supra Part I.A.
466. Schuck, supra note 4, at 30–31.
467. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274–78 (1986).
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as a justification for the expansion of affirmative action to included
LGBT individuals.
Professor Schuck explains that this justification has additional
support in the idea that “the presence of minority group members
in visible roles of leadership and influence is conducive, if not essen-
tial, to the legitimacy of social and political institutions. For minorities
to accept their outcomes as minimally just or at least acceptable,
they must view these institutions as inclusive . . . .” 468 Proponents
believe that without examples of success minorities minority youths
“might conclude that certain social roles and professional opportuni-
ties are closed to them.” 469
In applying this justification to the LGBT community, there
appears to be support in the need for role models for LGBT youths.470
In a 2012 study release by the Human Rights Campaign, the results
revealed that the biggest problem facing LGBT youth today is
acceptance.471 Several participants reported being the victim of verbal
harassment concerning their sexual orientation and nearly half of
the participants (47%) reported not “fitting in” in their communities.472
This report also quoted one of the participants as stating that he or
she wishes that he or she “could meet more gay people to talk to and
get to know.” 473 The report goes on to reveal that 92% of LGBT youth
say they hear a negative message about being LGBT; however, 78% re-
port hearing a positive message from the internet and their peers.474
These statistics show that there is a need for role models for
LGBT youths. In fact, as a result the challenges faced by LGBT
youths, Dan Savage and his partner Terry Miller created the “It
Gets Better Project,” which served to inspire LGBT youths facing
harassment.475 College and university affirmative action policies can
be used as a way to recruit LGBT students, who will in turn return to
their communities and provide role models for LGBT youth.476 These
role models can stress and provide example for LGBT youth that
they can succeed despite the perceived disadvantage of intolerance
468. Schuck, supra note 4, at 31.
469. Richard Delgago, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really
Want to be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222,1223 no. 5 (1991).
470. See, e.g. Byrne, supra note 13, at 70.
471. GROWING UP LGBT IN AMERICA, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN 7 (2012), available at
http://hrc-assets.s3-website-us-east-1-amazonaws.com//files/assets/resources/Growing
-Up-LGBT-in-America_Report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GUF6-94v4.
472. Id. at 10 (stating that 42% of LGBT youth report that the community they live
in is “not accepting of LGBT people”).
473. Id. at 9.
474. Id. at 18.
475. See IT GETS BETTER PROJECT, http://www.itgetsbetter.org/pages/about-it-gets
-better-project/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9WP9-MNXP.
476. Byrne, supra note 13, at 70 (discussing diversity in the workplace).
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and discrimination.477 They can also form much needed mentoring
relationships for LGBT students who, based on statistics, often feel
out of place and need someone to talk with.478 Based on the evidence
of the adversities that LGBT youths face and the need for role models
that can exemplify succeeding despite adversity, the use of affirma-
tive action policies for LGBT applicants by colleges and universities
is supported under the role model justification.
3. Diversity Justification
The diversity justification is where colleges and universities can
find the most support for granting affirmative action treatment in
the application process for self-identified LGBT students.479 Recall
that the diversity justification finds support in Justice Powell’s deci-
sion in Bakke.480 In that case, Justice Powell stated that “genuine
diversity” was a compelling interest which could justify considering
race and making it a “plus” factor in college and university admissions
policies.481 To justify this position, Justice Powell stated, “the atmo-
sphere of ‘speculation, experiment and creation’—so essential to the
quality of higher education—is widely believed to be promoted by a
diverse student body.” 482 He went on to state that “it is not too much
to say that the ‘nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure’ to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this
Nation of many peoples.” 483
However, it is important to remember that Justice Powell added
clarity as to the type of diversity that would further a compelling in-
terest. Justice Powell went on to state that “genuine diversity” was
more than “simple ethnic diversity,” and that “[t]he diversity that
furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array
of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin
is but a single though important element.” 484 Through his clarity,
Justice Powell did not limit the type of diversity that would further
a compelling interest to race or ethnicity, instead he defined diver-
sity broadly.485
477. See id.
478. See id; see also HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, supra note 471.
479. See Byrne, supra note 13, at 70.
480. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314–15 (1979).
481. Id. at 315 (opinion of Powell, J.) (stating that the goal of achieving the educational
benefits of a diverse student body is sufficiently “compelling” to justify the use of race as
a factor in university admission policies).
482. Id. at 312.
483. Id. at 313 (quoting Keyshian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
484. Id. at 315.
485. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
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The diversity justification is the least offensive justification. It re-
quires no looking back to recognize past wrongs, and, as Professor
Eugene Volokh stated, “it ascribes no guilt, calls for no arguments
about compensation. It seems to ask simply for rational, unbigoted
judgment. . . .” 486 Other commentators claim that it “describe[s] the
importance of our institutions being representative of all citizens
and truly democratic . . . . Diversity affirms the notion that different
groups need not conform to the dominant culture, need not mix into
it to be an accepted and important part of it.” 487 Furthermore, di-
versity seeks to obtain benefits that can be derived from varying
views because it seeks to challenge harmful stereotypes and com-
bats intolerance.488
Based on the broad definition of diversity, which requires some-
thing beyond racial and ethnic diversity, there is a logical argument
that sexual orientation would fit into the definition of diversity used
in the Bakke case.489 Additionally, the many benefits (such as inclu-
sion, tolerance, and acceptance) that can be derived from including
self-identified LGBT individuals into the definition of diversity, for
the purpose of affirmative action policies in college and university
admissions, are a significant justifications for these policies.490 Fur-
thermore, because the diversity justification does not require look-
ing back to past discrimination and comparing to other disadvantage
minorities (such as African Americans and women), the diversity justi-
fication is the most palatable way to justify extending affirmative ac-
tion to self-identified LGBT students.
C. Constitutionality of Affirmative Action Programs for
LGBT Applicants
In attempting to determine the constitutionality of any affirma-
tive action program, the Court often finds itself posed with two deci-
sions: (1) the correct standard of review to apply and (2) how much
deference should be given to the university.491 Indeed, the Court has
struggled with these decisions several times over in their quest to
486. Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA. L.
REV. 2059, 2060 (1996).
487. Stephanie M. Wildman, Integration in the 1980s: The Dream of Diversity and the
Cycle of Exclusion, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1625, 1658–59, n. 16 (1990).
488. Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Sub-
ordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 95, 125 (stating that inclusion is one of the best
“remedies for the expression of that labels people as subordinate”).
489. See supra Part IV.B.3.
490. See supra Part IV.B.2–3.
491. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 358–59, 365.
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determine the constitutionality of affirmative action programs.492
First, in Bakke, where the Court was splintered on whether to apply
a lower standard of review because the affirmative action program in
question in that case was a racial classification intended to be reme-
dial and not invidious.493 Then again in J.A. Croson Co., where the
Court finally decided that regardless of the purpose behind the clas-
sification, a classification based on race must be examined under
the strict scrutiny standard of review.494 For a racial classification
to be deemed constitutional under the strict scrutiny standard of re-
view, the classification must serve a compelling state interest and
be narrowly tailored to meet that compelling state interest.495 Fur-
thermore, “[t]he test also ensures that ‘the means chosen fit th[e] com-
pelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the
motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereo-
type.” 496 The narrowly tailored requirement gives the government
very little (if any) deference.497
However, the Court has struggled with how much deference to
give to the government, in this case the college or university, when de-
termining the appropriate means to accomplish diversity (the compel-
ling interest).498 This is particularly true in the Grutter case, where
Justice Kennedy took strong offense to the majority’s extreme defer-
ence to the law school in determining the proper means to achieve the
compelling interest of diversity.499 Because the admissions program
was a racial classification, the Court applied the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review.500 However, in determining whether the classifica-
tion was narrowly tailored, the Court gave great deference to the
school stating, “[w]e are satisfied that the Law School’s admissions
program, like the Harvard plan described by Justice Powell, does
not operate as a quota.” 501 Justice Kennedy believed that the strong
deference to the Law School circumvented the narrow tailoring prong
of the strict scrutiny requirement, which would have required the Law
School to show that its admission process was constitutional.502
492. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the Bakke decision).
493. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291.
494. 488 U.S. 469, 493, 520 (1989).
495. Id. at 493.
496. Id.; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
497. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 358–59, 365.
498. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387.
499. Id. at 388 (“The Court confuses deference to a university’s definition of its educa-
tional objective with deference to the implementation of this goal.”) (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting).
500. See id. at 387–88 (majority opinion).
501. Id. at 355.
502. Id. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Justice Kennedy also took offense to the Courts refusal to require
the Law School “to seriously explore race-neutral alternatives.”503
Justice Kennedy was disappointed in the Court’s “willingness to be
satisfied by the Law School’s profession of its own good faith.” 504
After the Fisher case, the law in the area of affirmative action
seems to be settled (at least for the time being).505 It requires strict
scrutiny for all racial classification.506 Diversity is still a compelling
state interest which is sufficient pass strict scrutiny.507 Furthermore,
no deference is to be given to universities and colleges in deciding the
appropriate means to accomplish that diversity, and narrow tailor-
ing still does not require exhausting race-neutral alternatives.508
1. Appropriate Level of Scrutiny
In applying the principles mentioned above to the affirmative
action treatment for self-identified LGBT applicants to colleges and
universities, it is important to note one unique distinction. The strict
scrutiny standard of review applies to affirmative action programs
based on racial classifications because “any racial preference must
face the most rigorous scrutiny by the courts.” 509 However, in the case
of other classifications not based on race, like sexual orientation, a
lower standard of review is required because these classifications are
not inherently suspect.510 The Court, in Romer v. Evans, reaffirmed
the proposition that classifications based on sexual orientation “have
so far been given the protection of heightened equal protection scru-
tiny.” 511 The Court went on to apply the rational basis review standard
requiring that the government action bear “a rational relation to some
legitimate end.” 512 Under rational basis review, “a law will be sus-
tained if it can be said to advance a legitimate government interest,
even if the law seems unwise or . . . if the rationale for it seems
tenuous.” 513 The rational basis standard of review grants great
deference to the government action.514 Furthermore, unlike with strict
scrutiny, rational basis scrutiny does not require that the law be
503. Id. at 394.
504. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 394.
505. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013).
506. Id.
507. Id. at 2419–20.
508. Id. at 2420.
509. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 519 (1989).
510. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 618, 640, n. 1 (1996).
511. Id. at 629.
512. Id. at 631–32.
513. Id. at 632.
514. Id. at 621, 632.
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narrowly tailored nor does it require the government to explore
neutral alternatives.515
In applying the rational basis standard of review, it is clear that
granting affirmative action treatment to self-identified LGBT students
in college and university admissions meets the rational basis stan-
dard.516 First, the government seems be advancing a legitimate in-
terest in diversity.517 For the last three decades since Bakke and
continuing in the Grutter, Gratz, and Fisher decisions, diversity has
been a compelling government interest.518 This is indeed the case
considering the Court’s reluctance to overhall its holding in the Fisher
case.519 A compelling interest, like diversity, clearly meets the lower
standard of a legitimate government interest. This is particularly
true when the Court has stated that under rational basis level of
review “a law will be sustained . . . even if the law seems unwise.” 520
This demonstrates that there is a lower standard required to justify
action under rational basis—viewed both as a legitimate government
interest, and a compelling interest, like diversity, would clearly meet
this lower standard.521
Next, affirmative action treatment for self-identified LGBT appli-
cants in college and university admissions bears a rational relation-
ship to the legitimate government interest of diversity. The Court
has held that under the rational basis review standard, government
action will be upheld even if the rationale for it seems tenuous.522
Justice Powell has indicated (and the Court has adopted) that the
diversity that furthers a compelling interest is more than just racial
and ethnic diversity.523 This broad definition of diversity can include
LGBT individuals. This means that policies adopted by colleges and
universities to give affirmative action treatment to self-identified
LGBT students would be reasonably related to accomplishing the
goal of student diversity.
Furthermore, traditional rational basis review grants extreme
deference to the government in determining the appropriate means to
515. Id.
516. Compare Romer, 517 U.S. at 635–36 with Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328
(2002).
517. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418–19 (2013).
518. Id. at 2417–18.
519. See id. at 2418–22, 2411.
520. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
521. Id.
522. Id. (“In the ordinary case, a law will be sustained if it can be said to advance a legiti-
mate government interest, even if the law seems unwise or work to the disadvantage of
a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems tenuous”).
523. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–12, 315 (1979); adopted in
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
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accomplish the legitimate government interest.524 The Court has
stated that a governmental action is not “subject to courtroom fact-
finding (sic) and may be based on rational speculation unsupported
by evidence or empirical data.” 525 By not requiring evidence or fact-
finding under rational basis review, the Court grants great defer-
ence to the government in determining the appropriate means to
accomplish the legitimate government interest.526 This means, in the
case of affirmative action treatment for self-identified LGBT stu-
dents, the Court will not look for statistical evidence that these poli-
cies are the appropriate means to accomplish the goal of diversity.
Nor would the Court require statistical evidence showing that LGBT
individuals are underrepresented at colleges or universities.
Notwithstanding the extreme deference that the Court grants
to government action under the traditional rational basis, the Court
seems to have embarked on a new rational basis analysis.527 Under
this new so-called rational basis with “bite,” the Court looks past the
suggested purpose and legitimate interest given by the government
to ensure that the classification was not “born out of animosity toward
the class of persons affected.”528 This trend is continued in the Windsor
opinion.529 However, even under this new rational basis analysis,
policies granting affirmative action treatment to self-identified LGBT
individuals in college and university admissions are likely to be
deemed constitutional because the classification is not born out of an
animosity or desire to harm any applicants in particular. Instead,
these programs are conceived out of the desire to convey the benefits
of diversity to the entire student body.
Furthermore, it seems relevant in the constitutional analysis of
an affirmative action program that grants a “plus” factor to a certain
class of applicants that the programs not place an undue burden on
the applicants who do not receive the special treatment.530 Indeed,
both Justice O’Connor and Justice Ginsburg have required proof that
the program does not burden applications of those students not
favored.531 It seems likely that this is only applied in the context of
strict scrutiny’s narrow tailoring requirement.532 However, even if
524. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632–33.
525. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
526. Id.
527. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634.
528. Id. at 620, 634.
529. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2014).
530. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2002).
531. See id. at 341, 539 U.S. at 339–41; see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303
(2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
532. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341. Justice O’Connor states that “[n]arrow tailoring . . .
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this was required under the rational basis review standard, admis-
sion policies that do not make LGBT status a decisive factor will pass
this test by placing every applicant on an equal playing field.
Therefore, based on the Court’s current law on affirmative action
and rational basis review, college and university admission policies
that would seek to grant a “plus” factor to self-identified LGBT appli-
cants would be constitutional. The rational basis standard of review
would apply because attending college is not a fundamental right
and LGBT individuals are not a suspect class.533 In addition, under
the rational basis standard of review, affirmative action treatment
for self-identified LGBT applicants would serve the legitimate interest
of diversity and would be rationally related to accomplishing stu-
dent diversity. Furthermore, the Court is likely to give some level of
deference to the colleges and universities in determining the best
method to accomplish that diversity.534 Finally, such policies are likely
to be constitutional because using a policy that only makes LGBT sta-
tus a “plus” factor without making it a decisive factor, would mean
that unfavored applicants are not burdened.
2. The Need for Programs that Give Affirmative Action
Treatment to LGBT Students
While affirmative action programs benefitting self-identified
LGBT individuals in college and university admissions would likely
withstand a constitutional challenge under the rational basis stan-
dard of review, the parallel between LGBT individuals, African Ameri-
cans and women provides little support for a need for affirmative
action treatment for LGBT individuals. Past discrimination against
women and African Americans was pervasive and closed the door to
many opportunities and successes for these individuals. The results
from this discrimination still exist today. In particular, women are
sorely underrepresented in leadership roles.535 African Americans are
underrepresented on college and university campuses, and in leader-
ship roles.536 Unlike the discrimination against women and African
Americans, discrimination against LGBT individuals did not com-
pletely lock the LGBT community out of opportunities.537 Instead
LGBT individuals were granted these opportunities, but could not
speak of or disclose their homosexuality. Over time this inevitably
requires that a race-conscious admissions program not unduly harm members of any racial
group.” Id.
533. Id. at 326–27; see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 640 n.1 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
534. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418–19 (2013).
535. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 184 (2013).
536. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2416; see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316.
537. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 184–85.
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resulted in many “closeted” successful LGBT individuals in leader-
ship roles. As a result of increased LGBT acceptance, these individu-
als have begun to disclose their sexuality or “come out.” However,
this is not to say that there are not incidences where LGBT individ-
uals were excluded from positions or opportunities because of their
sexual orientation.
Furthermore, the private nature of a student’s sexual orienta-
tion makes it difficult to determine whether affirmative action treat-
ment is necessary in college and university admission programs.
Unlike race and gender, which are obvious distinguishing character-
istics, homosexuality has to be disclosed. While it may be true that
there are some individuals whose sexual orientation may be clearly
discernible, generally one can only speculate as to that individual’s
sexual orientation. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized
this problem in the Windsor case stating that “[i]t is difficult to say
whether homosexuals are ‘under-represented’ in positions of power
and authority without knowing their number relative to the hetero-
sexual population.” 538 Since sexual orientation is such a private matter
and many individuals are met with hostility when they do disclose
their sexual orientation, evidence demonstrating a need for more self-
identified LGBT students is lacking. This evidence would provide a
strong basis for the implementation of affirmative action programs
in college and university admissions for LGBT students.
D. Pros and Cons
There are various benefits that can be derived from an admis-
sions policy that encourages LGBT students to voluntarily identify
themselves during the admission process. As Professor Jeffrey Byrne
put it, “lesbians and gay men can change individual attitudes and
prejudices by coming out and interacting with heterosexuals as openly
gay and lesbian people.” 539 As gay men and lesbians come out in the
admission process, hopefully these individuals will be comfortable
being themselves on campus. These openly gay students will play an
important role in changing the traditional stereotypes associated
with being homosexual and encouraging both acceptance and inclu-
sion. Additionally, giving affirmative action treatment to self-identi-
fied LGBT students in college and university admissions sends a
positive message to the public and potential applicants: that the col-
lege or university is striving to ensure that every student has an
538. Id. at 184.
539. Byrne, supra note 13, at 55.
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equal opportunity to achieve a higher education degree no matter
what his or her background may be.
On the other hand, there are a few drawbacks to affirmative
action treatment for self-identified LGBT students. First, many com-
mentators are concerned with the possible stigma associated with
affirmative action treatment.540 These critics claim that affirmative
action treatment for LGBT individuals would “stamp” beneficiaries
with a “badge of inferiority.” 541 This badge of inferiority would in turn
open LGBT beneficiaries of affirmative action treatment up to ques-
tions about whether affirmative action played a role in their ad-
vancement, which even marks those persons who succeeded without
affirmative action. Additionally, some believe that affirmative ac-
tion for LGBT individuals would violate the privacy rights of LGBT
individuals.542 In particular, this critique states that affirmative ac-
tion treatment for LGBT individuals would place pressure on these
individuals to disclose their status and “unacceptably encroach upon
the free exercise of their privacy rights.” 543 Finally, there are some
concerns that some applicants will attempt to abuse the policy by
making false statements disclosing that they are gay to help them in-
crease their chances of getting into a good college.544 In particular,
it is difficult to ensure that the students that identify themselves as
LGBT individuals are in fact members of the LGBT community.
Before creating an admissions policy that gives affirmative action
treatment to self-identified LGBT students, colleges and universi-
ties should give careful consideration to the benefits and the disad-
vantages of such policies. Not only should these advantages and
disadvantages be viewed from the perspective of the college or uni-
versity, but also from the students’ perspective.
E. Cautions
In seeking to adopt policies that give affirmative action treatment
to applicants who disclose themselves as members the LGBT commu-
nity, there are several cautions that colleges and universities may
want to consider. First, the strongest justification for affirmative ac-
tion treatment for students that self-identify as members of the
540. Byrne, supra note 13, at 84; see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373 (Thomas, J., dis-
senting).
541. Byrne, supra note 13, at 84.
542. See id. at 80–82.
543. Id. at 81.
544. Jaschik, supra note 12 (quoting Greg McCandless, associate director of admission
at Harvey Mudd College as saying “What if people just start to say, ‘Hey, I’m gay.’ Are
we going to follow them around for a semester?”).
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LGBT community is diversity.545 With this in mind, colleges and uni-
versities should expand this definition of diversity to include, not only
LGBT applicants, but also “ ‘straight allies’ of gay students . . . because
a college benefits from having people who are ‘bridge builders.’ ” 546
Furthermore, this ensures that straight students are not burdened
by the affirmative action treatment. Next, the information gathered
should not only be used to grant affirmative action treatment, but
it should also be used in making housing choices, directing students
to organizations on campus, and in helping to serve the LGBT stu-
dents that already exist on campuses.
Next, colleges and universities should preserve the privacy of stu-
dents. First, as with questions about race and ethnicity, questions
about sexual orientation should be optional. Furthermore, to ensure
that students do not feel compelled to disclose their sexual orienta-
tion, questions about sexual orientation can be hidden in personal
statements, such as the one used by University of Michigan law school
requiring students to explain how they will add to the student body
diversity.547 This ensures that students do not feel compelled to dis-
close their sexual orientation.
CONCLUSION
Affirmative action policies in colleges and universities are con-
troversial in general.548 This is even more apparent when contem-
plating whether colleges and universities should grant affirmative
action treatment to students who self-identify themselves as mem-
bers of the LGBT community. Under current Supreme Court prece-
dent, there seems to be support for this position if these policies take
a holistic view of each student.549 First, there is strong support for
affirmative action treatment for LGBT students, not in remedying
past discrimination, but based on student body diversity.550 Second,
the policies would likely pass rational basis review because under cur-
rent law, diversity is a compelling interest and affirmative action
programs geared towards LGBT students would increase student
body diversity.551
The most difficult question when contemplating whether LGBT
students should be given affirmative action treatment during both
545. Id. at 2.
546. Id.
547. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315 (2002).
548. Jaschik, supra note 12, at 2.
549. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315–16.
550. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418–19 (2013).
551. Id.
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college and university admissions process is whether there is a need
for such programs. Considering the fact that there is very limited
evidence of disparities between heterosexual individuals and LGBT
individuals in colleges and universities, affirmative action treatment
may not be warranted.552 This question in further complicated when
considering the private and non-apparent nature of sexual orientation.
Nonetheless, colleges and universities have begun asking students
their sexual orientation on admission applications.553 With this comes
the potential that colleges and universities may begin granting affir-
mative action treatment for LGBT students to accomplish student
diversity, which could change affirmative action policies forever.
552. A Survey of LGBT Americans, supra note 3.
553. Mannion, supra note 12.

